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ABSTRACT
Punitive damages were described by one early court as "an
unsightly and an unhealthy excrescense." Although views toward
punitive relief have changed over the years, the debate over the
availability of exemplary damages in the judicial system has
remained controversial. No place is that controversy more aptly
demonstrated than in employment discrimination law, where
punitive damages first became available in an amendment to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 after a bitter congressional debate.
Almost a decade ago, in Kolstad v. American Dental Association, the
Supreme Court provided guidance on how punitive damages should
be applied in discrimination cases brought under Title VII. Kolstad
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. I would like
to thank Dennis Nolan and Jeffrey Hirsch for their invaluable comments and suggestions
during the development of this Article. I would also like to thank Benjamin Gutman and
Daniel Vail for their significant help in developing the new legal framework advanced in this
Article. Finally, I am indebted to my loving wife Megan, whose endless support (and editorial
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735
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
has only generated more confusion concerning the proper standard
for exemplary relief, and recent district and appellate court decisions
reflect this uncertainty.
Attempting to determine the impact of punitive damages in Title
VII cases after Kolstad, I performed an analysis of all federal district
court decisions during the calendar years of 2004 and 2005. The
study examined over six hundred district court opinions issued
during this timeframe. Of these cases, there were only twenty-four
district court decisions either awarding punitive damages under
Title VII or upholding a jury's award of punitive relief An addi-
tional study further revealed that slightly less than 18 percent of
those Title VII cases that went to a jury resulted in a punitive
damage award by the jury, and approximately 29 percent of those
juries that found in favor of the plaintiff also awarded punitive
damages.
This Article explores the basic foundations of punitive damages in
the American judicial system, and examines the goals of providing
this form of relief in employment discrimination cases. The Article
further examines a study performed on the effectiveness of punitive
damages in Title VII cases. After analyzing this data, this Article
suggests one alternative way of better achieving the original deterrent
purpose behind the addition of punitive damages to Title VII. The
Article proposes a three-part framework for analyzing all cases of
intentional discrimination and recommends adopting a new scheme
for remedial relief under Title VII. The Article then explores the
implications of adopting the proposed approach and examines how
the proposal fits within the contours of the academic scholarship.
The Article concludes by urging that the congressional intent of
deterring unlawful discrimination can more properly be achieved
through the proposed form of relief.
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A CALL FOR CHANGE
"A billion dollars to them is chump change."
-Member of jury that awarded $11.8 billion in punitive
damages in case brought against Exxon Mobil Corporation.1
INTRODUCTION
"[M]onstrous heresy."2 This is how one early court described the
role of punitive damages in civil litigation.3 Though punitive
damages can be seen as "an unsightly and an unhealthy excres-
cense, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law,"4 there can be
little doubt that one of the primary purposes of such relief is to help
deter unlawful conduct.5
Before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 19916 (1991 CRA),
punitive damages were not one of the resources plaintiffs had at
their disposal to fight employment discrimination.7 That would
change, however, when Congress passed the 1991 CRA with the
express purpose of helping to "combat the persistence of employ-
ment discrimination."' Through the addition of compensatory and
punitive damages to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
1. Exxon Told To Pay $11.9 Billion to Alabama, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 2003, at C1. The
$11.8 billion punitive damage award involved a dispute with the state of Alabama over how
gas royalties should have been calculated. See generally Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ala. Dep't of
Conservation & Natural Res., 986 So.2d 1093 (Ala. 2007). The trial court reduced the jury's
punitive damage award to $3.5 billion. Id. at 1100. The Alabama Supreme Court subsequently
eliminated all of the punitive damages in the case. Id. at 1116-18.
2. David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39
VILL. L. REV. 363, 370 (1994) (quoting Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872)).
3. Id. (discussing the Fay decision).
4. Fay, 53 N.H. at 382.
5. Owen, supra note 2, at 377-78.
6. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)).
7. See, e.g., Franklin G. Shuler, Jr., Employment Discrimination and Other Employment-
Related Claims After Burke: When Are Amounts Received Taxable?, 9 LAB. LAW. 189, 192-93
(1993) (noting that Title VII was amended to include punitive damages); cf. Rebecca K.
Beerling, Left Out of the Balance-The Public's Need for Protection Against Workplace
Discrimination: Waffle House and Kidder Peabody Attempt to Limit the Remedies Available
to the EEOC by Balancing Policies Not in Conflict, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 295, 304 (2002) ("One
of the influential changes made in the [1991 CRA] was adding punitive and compensatory
damages to the EEOC's arsenal of remedial powers for both Title VII and ADA claims.").
8. Vanessa Ruggles, Note, The Ineffectiveness of Capped Damages in Cases of Employ-
ment Discrimination: Solutions Toward Deterrence, 6 CoNN. PUB. INT. L.J. 143, 154 (2006).
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1991 CRA was designed "to effectuate a greater level of deterrence."9
In many respects, Title VII was a "toothless tiger" prior to the 1991
amendments, which gave litigants the ability to obtain significant
monetary relief.' ° Rather than simply making the plaintiff whole,
the addition of punitive damages to Title VII gave courts and
juries a way to punish employers for their illegal conduct." Indeed,
Congress hoped that imposing additional damages on those
employers that violate Title VII would help to prevent such dis-
criminatory conduct, and the public certainly perceives that
punitive damage awards are instrumental in eradicating unlawful
employment practices.'" Even the mention of punitive damages
strikes a certain fear in the hearts of executives of large and small
corporations alike-though the current statutory caps do provide
some level of comfort to employers.' 3 Punitive damages are thus
widely regarded as one of the single greatest motivators in prevent-
ing employers from discriminating against their workers. 4
9. Id.
10. See id. at 151 ("[P]rior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, plaintiffs in Title
VII and ADA actions could only seek equitable relief and were not entitled to a jury trial,
rendering these laws 'toothless tigers.').
11. See The Supreme Court, 1998 Term, Leading Cases, 113 HARv. L. REv. 200, 368 (1999)
[hereinafter Leading Cases] ("By making punitive damages available to victims of intentional
employment discrimination, Congress intended to do more than to ask employers to try to
comply with Title VII-it intended to punish them if they failed to comply.").
12. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.2, at 1 (1991) (reflecting Congress's intent to deter
employment discrimination with the addition of punitive damages to Title VII).
13. See, e.g., Kelly Koenig Levi, Allowing a Title VII Punitive Damage Award Without an
Accompanying Compensatory or Nominal Award: Further Unifying the Federal Civil Rights
Laws, 89 KY. L.J. 581,582-83 (2001) (describing punitive damages and noting that "[p]laintiffs
want them, defendants fear them, juries award them, and the public is often fascinated by
them" (citation omitted)); Elizabeth Pryor Johnson, Employers Face Threat of Punitive
Damages, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 12, 1999, at 8 ("Just the threat of a large punitive
damages award often can drive employers to settle cases they might not normally think
should be settled."); see also infra Part V.A.3. (discussing Title VII's statutory caps).
14. See, e.g., Julie A. Friedlander, Note, Punitive Damages as a Remedy for Discrimination
Claim Arbitrations in the Securities Industry, 23 HOFSTRAL. REV. 225,227 (1994) (noting that
plaintiffs seek exemplary relief to "deter their companies from engaging in such employment
practices in the future"); Tamara Schiffner, Note, Employment Law: The Employer Escape
Chute from Punitive Liability Under Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 181,
210 (2001) (noting that a Supreme Court decision allowing employers to avoid punitive
damage liability through good-faith efforts at complying with Title VII "has the potential to
make anti-discrimination programs the norm in workplaces across the United States and
eventually result in complete fulfillment of the deterrent purpose underlying [the statute]").
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Against this backdrop, I embarked on a study of recent employ-
ment discrimination cases in which punitive damages had been
awarded. My goal was to generate enough data to identify trends in
punitive damage awards in cases brought pursuant to Title VII. I
was particularly interested in determining whether Kolstad v.
American Dental Ass'n, 5 the seminal Supreme Court decision that
outlined the standards to be applied to Title VII punitive damages
cases, changed in any fundamental fashion the way the lower
courts approached their analyses in these cases. I am aware of no
substantive empirical studies examining the impact of the Kolstad
decision in the context of Title VII punitive damages.' 6
The results of my analysis were surprising. In 2004 and 2005,
36,676 employment law cases were filed in all of the federal district
courts in the United States. v A search of all published federal
district court decisions for the calendar years of 2004 and 2005 that
referenced both Title VII and punitive damages resulted in 676
cases. 8 After analyzing each of these cases, I concluded that only
twenty-four decisions included cases where a district court either
awarded punitive damages under Title VII or upheld a jury's award
of punitive relief. 9 This is hardly the kind of raw data that can lead
to any reasoned analysis of trends or patterns of remedies in
employment discrimination cases.
Moreover, the results of additional research demonstrated some
reluctance on the part of juries to award punitive relief. Slightly less
than 18 percent of those Title VII cases that went to a jury during
2004 and 2005 resulted in a punitive damage award by the jury, and
approximately 29 percent of those juries that found in favor of the
plaintiff also awarded punitive damages.2 ° There are many reasons
why plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in obtaining punitive relief in
15. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
16. There are a number of studies of punitive damages in the context of product liability
cases, however. See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data and
Further Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 15, 31-33.
17. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, tbl.C-2A (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/contents.html
(identifying that between Oct. 1, 2003, and Sept. 30, 2004, 19,746 suits were filed; between
Oct. 1, 2004, and Sept. 30, 2005, 16,930 suits were filed).
18. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the methodology used in the analysis).
19. See infra Part IV.B.
20. See infra Part IV.D.2.
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employment discrimination cases, and these reasons are explored
in greater detail in this Article.2 Regardless of the rationale, how-
ever, without more published decisions imposing punitive awards,
their deterrent effect will likely begin to wane. It is for this reason
that reform in this area of the law is necessary.
Part I of this Article examines the history of punitive damages
generally, and their role in the American legal framework and court
system. Part II of this Article further examines the passage of the
1991 CRA and explores why Congress and legal theorists believed
punitive damages were a critical component missing from Title VII.
Part III discusses the Supreme Court's review of Title VII punitive
damages in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n. Part IV then explores
the data uncovered through an examination of all published federal
district court decisions during 2004 and 2005, setting forth the
methodology of this study. Part V concludes by explaining the
necessity for reform in the application of punitive damages to Title
VII cases. The Article proposes an alternative approach to the
remedial provisions of Title VII which would bring the statute more
in line with other areas of employment law. Part VI of the Article
then explains how the proposed three-part framework for examining
all cases of intentional discrimination fits within the contours of
existing academic scholarship.
I. THE HISTORY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND THE LAW
A. Evolution of Doctrine in American Law
Punitive (or "exemplary") damages are not a recent phenom-
enon,22 and have been described as an "ancient curiosity."23 Indeed,
these damages date back over four millennia to 2000 B.C. and the
21. See infra Part IV.E (discussing the impact of courts vacating jury punitive damage
awards in employment discrimination cases).
22. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2620-21 (2008) (outlining the
history of punitive damages).
23. Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiffs Windfall from Punitive Damage
Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900, 1900 (1992) [hereinafter An Economic Analysis] (quoting
E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40
ALA. L. REV. 1053, 1055 (1989)).
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Code of Hammurabi, and evolved as part of the common law.24
Pursuant to the Code, for example, a man who stole an ox, sheep, or
pig from a temple or palace would be required to pay damages
thirtyfold the worth of the animal.2
The theory of punitive damages persisted through the following
centuries.2" For example, the Magna Carta contains three chapters
on the system of amercements, that, in many respects, operated in
a similar manner to punitive damages under the current U.S. legal
system.27 The amercement system allowed wrongdoers to buy back
their "grace under the law" through payments to the Crown.2' A
jury, rather than a judge, determined the amount of the payments,
and was instructed to consider "[t]he gravity of the offense and the
wealth of the wrongdoer" in reaching an appropriate award.29
Over time, punitive damages came to satisfy the particular
requirements of society, including "punishment and deterrence of
wrongdoers, and [also] as a substitute for revenge."3 Under English
common law, punitive damages "appeared discreetly ... overshad-
owed by the legal and moral issues" of the cases in which they were
awarded.31 Like in the American legal system, punitive damages in
England have been the subject of controversy over the years, and
these damages "practically were abolished" in the country in 1964.32
Punitive damages in the American legal system can be traced to
English common law.33 In 1784, in Genay v. Norris,34 an American
state court adopted the theory of punitive relief enunciated by
the English courts in a case in which the plaintiff became sick
24. 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 1 (4th ed. 2000).
25. Melvin M. Belli, Sr., Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in
Present-Day Society, 49 UMKC L. REv. 1, 2 (1980).
26. Id.
27. See Justice Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion for Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of
Punitive Damage Awards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L. REV. 61, 63-64 (1992).
28. Id. at 64.
29. Id.
30. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 24, at 1.
31. Belli, supra note 25, at 3.
32. Id. at 4.
33. See MARK PETERSON, SYAM SARMA & MICHAEL SHANLEY, PuNITIVE DAMAGES,
EMPIRIcAL FINDINGS 1-2 (1987) (discussing the American history of punitive damages and
setting forth the English decision of Wilkes v. Wood, 1 Lofft. 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763),
which addressed punitive damages).
34. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6 (S.C. Comm. P1. 1784).
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after drinking wine that the defendant had spiked with Spanish
Fly. 5 The court awarded "exemplary damages" to the plaintiff.
36
Moreover, in 1791, a New Jersey court granted punitive relief for
the explicit purpose of making an "example[ ]" of the defendant in an
action which involved the breach of a promise to marry.3"
By the mid-nineteenth century, punitive damages were well
established in the United States." In Day v. Woodworth,"s the U.S.
Supreme Court resolved any question on the availability of punitive
relief, stating that it was settled that "a jury may inflict what are
called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defen-
dant."4 The Court acknowledged that "the propriety of this doctrine
has been questioned," but noted that "repeated judicial decisions"
would support the view that punitive damages were appropriate,
depending upon the particular circumstances and the "degree of
moral turpitude or atrocity of the defendant's conduct."'"
Punitive damages are presently a widely accepted form of relief
under American law. It has been well established in the United
States for "over a century that punitive damages are noncom-
pensatory in character."42 Almost all states allow some form of
punitive relief upon a specified showing of proof.43 Punitive damages
are, and have been for decades, a "fixture in American law."44
Nonetheless, the debate over punitive damages persists. Many
scholars evaluating punitive damages have agreed that this form
35. Id.; see also Owen, supra note 2, at 369 (discussing the decision).
36. Genay, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 7; see also Owen, supra note 2, at 369 & n.26.
37. Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791) (emphasis omitted); see also Belli, supra note
25, at 4 (discussing Coryell decision). The court instructed the jury that it was "bound to no
certain damages, but might give such a sum, as would mark their disapprobation, and be an
example to others." Coryell, 1 N.J.L at 78.
38. See, e.g., SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 24, at 16 (discussing the history of
punitive damages in the United States). See generally Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct.
2605, 2620 (2008) (noting that the punitive damages doctrine "promptly crossed the Atlantic"
and was "widely accepted in American courts by the middle of the 19th century").
39. 54 U.S. 363 (1851).
40. Id. at 371; see SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 24, at 16 (discussing Supreme Court's
decision in Woodworth).
41. Woodworth, 54 U.S. at 371; see also Owen, supra note 2, at 369 (discussing the
Woodworth decision and the history of punitive damages).
42. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 24, at 16.
43. Belli, supra note 25, at 4.
44. Owen, supra note 2, at 369.
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of relief is "a necessary component in an efficient civil justice
system."45 Punitive awards, however, are also seen as "an anomaly"
in the justice system that "should be abolished except where
specifically authorized by statute."46
B. Purpose of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are those damages that are "awarded in
addition to actual damages when the defendant acted with reckless-
ness, malice, or deceit."4 The purpose of this type of relief is much
more difficult to capture. For the most part, exemplary damages
have been justified by three different rationales: retribution,
deterrence, and education.
48
First, punitive relief is a form of retribution or revenge. 49 As one
of the primary purposes of exemplary damages, this relief is viewed
as a way of punishing the wrongdoer.5" The retribution function
serves not only the need of the individual victims, but society as a
whole.5' Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes summarized the benefit of
allowing the law, rather than individuals, to achieve some form of
retribution when a wrong has been suffered, stating that "[i]f people
would gratify the passion of revenge outside of the law, if the law
did not help them, the law has no choice but to satisfy the craving
itself, and thus avoid the greater evil of private retribution."52
45. Shores, supra note 27, at 69. But see STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, HISTORICAL
FICTION: PUNITIVE DAMAGES, CHANGE, AND THE POLITICS OF IDEAS 1-3 (1996) (discussing the
legal debate over punitive damages and the argument for tort reform).
46. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF THE COMMITTEE ON
SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 8 (1989).
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 396 (7th ed. 1999).
48. Seegenerally Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605,2620-21 (2008) (discussing
"various rationales" for exemplary damages).
49. Owen, supra note 2, at 375 ("It may initially seem strange in a modern legal system
for the law to be based on a kind of private revenge, but it is entirely appropriate for the law
to allow a person injured by the wanton misconduct of another to vent his outrage by
extracting from the wrongdoer a judicial fine.").
50. See Jim Gash, Solving the Multiple Punishments Problem: A Call for a National
Punitive Damages Registry, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1613, 1670 (2005); cf. Exxon Shipping Co., 128
S. Ct. at 2621 ("Regardless of the alternative rationales over the years, the consensus today
is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring
harmful conduct.").
51. Id.
52. See Steven Sneiderman, Comment, The Future of Punitive Damages After Browning-
2008]
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Perhaps an antiquated theory in support of punitive relief, revenge
"seems incompatible with our modern conception of the judicial
system."53 Still, retribution is often cited as one of the primary bases
for awarding punitive relief.54 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has
even described exemplary damages as "quasi-criminal" relief that is
"specifically designed to exact punishment in excess of actual harm
to make clear that the defendant's misconduct was especially
reprehensible. 55
Second, punitive damages are a way to deter the wrongdoer (or
potential wrongdoers) from engaging in repeat conduct against the
plaintiff.56 This function of exemplary relief is premised on the
economic theory that a wrongdoer who is required to pay a victim
above and beyond the harm actually suffered will be less likely to
engage in the wrongful conduct in the future.57 By deterring future
misconduct, punitive relief serves to "enforce desirable social norms"
and results in a "positive gain to society."58 Additionally, to the
extent that not every victim decides to seek relief for a particular
wrong, courts are able to deter defendants from continuing their
conduct by increasing the awards of those plaintiffs that choose to
litigate, thereby "forc[ing] defendants in the aggregate to internalize
[the victim's] harm fully."59 This function of punitive damages is also
directly tied to the revenge function, as exemplary relief also serves
Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1031, 1036 (1990) (quoting OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 4 (1881)).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Lisa Litwiller, From Exxon to Engle: The Futility of Assessing Punitive
Damages as Against Corporate Entities, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 301, 324-25 (2004) (noting that
punitive damages are often viewed as a form of"retribution for malicious misconduct in order
to assuage the community's sense of outrage").
55. Id. at 324 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
56. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 2, at 377.
57. Meredith Matheson Thorns, Comment, Punitive Damages in Texas: Examining the
Need for a Split-Recovery Statute, 35 ST. MARY'S L.J. 207, 216 (2003) (discussing deterrence
as a rationale for punitive damages in the civil justice system).
58. Leslie E. John, Comment, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive Damages
in the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2033, 2053 (1986) (discussing the role
of deterrence in punitive damage awards).
59. An Economic Analysis, supra note 23, at 1901.
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to deter victims from seeking their own revenge against a defen-
dant.6 °
Finally, punitive damages are a way of educating the wrongdoer
and society as a whole.6 In this regard, exemplary relief affirms
both the "protected right" of the plaintiff and the "correlative legal
duty" of the defendant to respect the plaintiff's right.62 And punitive
damages demonstrate the disapproval "society attaches to [the]
flagrant invasion [of a right] by the kind of conduct engaged in by
the defendant."63
Though deterrence, retribution, and education are the primary
rationales in support of punitive damages, this form of relief also
serves to compensate victims where traditional compensatory
awards are insufficient.' Additionally, punitive damages have also
been said to serve a procedural law-enforcement mechanism,
whereby they encourage "reluctant victims to press their claims and
enforce the rules of law. 65
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
At the time of the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, victims of employment discrimination were limited to ob-
taining relief that was primarily equitable in nature.66 When Title
60. See John, supra note 58, at 2053.
61. See Owen, supra note 2, at 374-75; Andrew Sparks, Comment, The Current State of
Punitive Damages in Environmental Litigation: An Examination of North American BMW v.
Gore, 14 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 289, 291 (1998-99) (noting that "proponents point to
the desire of society to educate individuals and affirm societal standards of conduct" as a
justification for punitive damages).
62. Owen, supra note 2, at 374-75.
63. Id. at 374.
64. See id. at 378-79 ("[S]uch awards also serve to reimburse the plaintiff for losses not
ordinarily recoverable as compensatory damages, such as actual losses the plaintiff is unable
to prove or for which the rules of damages do not provide relief, including and most
importantly, the expenses of bringing suit."); Nathan C. Prater, Comment, Punitive Damages
in Alabama: A Proposal for Reform, 26 CuMB. L. REV. 1005, 1030 (1995-96) (noting that
"compensation of victims for otherwise uncompensable losses" serves as a justification for
exemplary relief).
65. Owen, supra note 2, at 380; see also Prater, supra note 64, at 1030 (setting forth
modern rationales for punitive damages including "inducement of private law enforcement').
66. See Sarah Dale, Note, Reconsidering the Approach to 23(b)(2) Employment
Discrimination Class Actions in Light of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 38 CONN. L. REV. 967,976 (2006)
("Prior to 1991, a plaintiff suing under Title VII could recover only equitable relief, which
20081
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VII was passed, the statute contained no provision for aggrieved
individuals to obtain either compensatory or punitive damages.67
Though Title VII was extremely effective in helping to vindicate the
rights of those individuals that had been discriminated against, the
lack of compensatory or punitive relief in the statute was problem-
atic. 8 As one commentator noted less than a decade after the
passage of Title VII, "[d]iscrimination is so obnoxious to our ideals
and so injurious to the nation as a whole that this form of punish-
ment and deterrence [in allowing punitive damages] is justified." 9
At the time, some believed that the lack of punitive damages in Title
VII undermined the statute's ability to deter wrongful conduct.7 °
The addition of punitive damages, they argued, was necessary to
help effectuate the enforcement of the statute, as this relief would
encourage victims of discrimination to bring suit.7 Under the
original statutory scheme of Title VII, a successful plaintiff could
expect to obtain relief that was "hardly enough to inspire such a
plaintiff to stand up for her rights. 72 Others argued that Congress
included back pay but no other monetary damages.").
67. See Jennifer Miyoko Follette, Comment, Complete Justice: Upholding the Principles
of Title VII Through Appropriate Treatment ofAfter-Acquired Evidence, 68 WASH. L. REV. 651,
655 (1993) ('The 1991 amendments to Title VII greatly expanded the ability of the courts to
make victims of discrimination whole. Section 102 of the 1991 amendments entitles plaintiffs
to recover compensatory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination.").
68. See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1263 (1971) [hereinafter Employment
Discrimination and Title VII] ("[C]ourts and commentators have recently become aware of the
special appropriateness of punitive damages in actions under the civil rights laws."); Barbara
A. Norris, Comment, Comparable Worth, Disparate Impact, and the Market Rate Salary
Problem: A Legal Analysis and Statistical Application, 71 CAL. L. REV. 730, 744 (1983)
("Disparate impact theory is just as much imbedded in Title VII hiring and promotion case
law as is disparate treatment theory, and the courts have used the two doctrines in tandem
effectively to combat discrimination.").
69. See Employment Discrimination and Title VII, supra note 68, at 1263.
70. See, e.g., Krista J. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1461, 1462, 1475 (1986) ("Because Title VII
remedies are primarily injunctive, they fail to compensate fully for the severe personal harm
inflicted upon most victims. Punitive damages, which can impose a powerful deterrent on an
offending party, are also unavailable." (footnote omitted)).
71. See Employment Discrimination and Title VII, supra note 68, at 1263; Christine 0.
Merriman & Cora G. Yang, Note, Employer Liability for Coworker Sexual Harassment Under
Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 83, 112 (1984-85) ("If courts continue to deny
money awards to victims of coworker sexual harassment, Congress should amend Title VII
to expressly provide for these remedies.").
72. LEX K LARSON, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991, at 10 (1992).
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had originally intended for courts to be able to provide any type
of relief that they deemed necessary, so adding punitive damages
to Title VII would therefore "restore the statute to its originally
intended role. 73
A. Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
In 1991, Congress passed the 1991 CRA. Among other significant
changes to Title VII, the 1991 CRA provided for compensatory and
punitive damages." The legislative history of this amendment to
Title VII demonstrates that Congress understood the need for
adding punitive damages as a weapon for fighting employment
discrimination. 75 A House Report on the 1991 CRA explains that the
summary and purpose of the amendment was to "strengthen
existing protections and remedies available under federal civil
rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and adequate
compensation for victims of discrimination. "76
In considering the 1991 CRA, Congress thus believed that the
"existing protections and remedies" in the statute were not "ade-
quate to deter unlawful discrimination or to compensate victims of
intentional discrimination," and that the addition of exemplary
relief was therefore necessary.77 Congress further explained that it
had heard significant testimony revealing that punitive damages
were necessary to deter employment discrimination:
Numerous courts, commentators, and witnesses before the
Committee underscored that Title VII's exclusive remedy is
inadequate .... [One corporate witness explained] that under
Title VII's current remedial scheme ... "[tihe big impact of
[adding damages to Title VII would] be what employers do in the
way of prevention."...
73. Sharon T. Bradford, Note, Relief for Hostile Work Environment Discrimination:
Restoring Title VII's Remedial Powers, 99 YALE L.J. 1611, 1619 (1990).
74. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew T. Bodie, The Effects of Jury Ignorance About
Damage Caps: The Case of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1366 (2005)
(noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 allowed "federal employment discrimination
plaintiffs to recover compensatory and punitive damages for the first time").
75. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.1, at 18 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.2, at 1.
76. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.2, at 1.
77. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.1, at 18.
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[O]ne of the foremost experts on the sexual harassment in the
workplace and a consultant to leading corporations [further
testified that]: "Measures such as those proposed in the bill will,
I believe, encourage employers to design and implement
complaint structures which encourage victims to come forward
"78
In considering the legislation, Congress was thus clear that,
based on the testimony before it, the addition of new remedial relief
to Title VII was a critical component of deterring future wrongful
conduct and encouraging "private enforcement" of the statute.79 This
"compelling need" for new relief would lead to the passage of the
1991 CRA, which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
to add punitive damages and compensatory relief.8"
B. The Revised Statute
After two years of "often rancorous debate," Congress passed,
and President George H.W. Bush signed into law, the 1991 CRA.81
The addition of punitive damages to Title VII would "fundamen-
tally" alter the 'legal model underlying federal employment dis-
crimination laws," shifting the focus of the statute from conciliation
and employer change to a model similar to tort law that was
targeted more at obtaining monetary relief.82 It was argued that the
amendments were "among the most sweeping civil rights legislation
78. Id. at 69. Other testimony before Congress revealed that
[C]ompensatory and punitive damages will not give back to a plaintiff, in many
cases, the career that they lost or the ability to rise further in that career.
Congress doesn't have the ability to do that. It's a lasting permanent damage.
I think what the increased remedies under the bill will do, however, is primarily
act as a deterrent .... It is the deterrent value that is so important.
Id.
79. Id. at 70; see also Steven Sanborn, Note, Employment Discrimination-Miller v.
Maxwell's International, Inc.: Individual Liability for Supervisory Employees Under Title VII
and the ADEA, 17 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 143, 153 (1995) (discussing the legislative history of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
80. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.1, at 1, 70.
81. Susan Schenkel-Savitt, New and Improved Remedies for Intentional Discrimination
and the Expanded Reach of Title VII and the Disabilities Acts, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1991: ITS IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 219, 219 (Susan Ritz ed.,
1992).
82. DAVID A. CATHCART & MARK SNYDERMAN, THE CIVIL RIGHTs AT OF 1991, at 10 (1992).
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to be passed by Congress," and that the act provided exemplary
damages that were "sorely lacking from previous legislation." 3
Under the revised statute, a plaintiff is now entitled to pursue
punitive damages if that individual can show that the defendant
"engaged in a discriminatory practice" with "malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual."' As part of a compromise, the statute also contains
limitations (or statutory caps) on the size of the potential award. 5
Maximum award amounts vary depending upon the size of the
employer, with a maximum potential liability of $300,000 for
companies with 500 or more employees."6 In addition to the stat-
utory cap, plaintiffs can also obtain back pay, front pay, and certain
interest.8
7
III. THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER
TITLE VII
A. Kolstad v. American Dental Association
Nearly a decade ago, the Supreme Court provided the seminal
case on punitive damages in Title VII employment discrimination
matters in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n.ss In Kolstad, the Court
considered whether the appellate court had erred in upholding a
district court's decision to preclude the issue of punitive damages
from going to a jury in a gender discrimination matter.8 9 The
defendant, the American Dental Association, had denied the plain-
tiff, Carole Kolstad, a promotion in favor of a male employee.9"
Kolstad alleged that the defendant had "preselect[ed]" the male
83. Susan Ritz, Introduction to THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: ITS IMPACT ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION, supra note 81, at 9.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(1) (2000).
85. See, e.g., Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension Between
Legislative Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEx. L. REV. 345, 408 (1995) ("[Ihe caps on
compensatory and punitive damages in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 evidently were enacted
as part of a compromise between those who wanted traditional jury determination of damages
and those who did not want jury trial at all in actions under the Act.").
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) (2000).
87. Id. § 1981a(b)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000).
88. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
89. Id. at 531-33.
90. Id. at 530-31.
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employee for the position, and that the acting head of the organiza-
tion had told sexually offensive jokes and used derogatory language
in reference to women. 91 Kolstad further maintained that the acting
head of the association had refused to even meet with her about the
open position for several weeks. 92 After a jury trial on the issue of
gender discrimination, Kolstad was awarded $52,718 in back pay. 9'
The district court did not allow the issue of punitive damages to go
to the jury.94 In a post judgment decision, the district court was clear
that "it had not been persuaded" that the defendant made the
promotion decision on the basis of sex.9 Sitting en banc, the Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court, holding
that 'before the question of punitive damages can go to the jury, the
evidence of the defendant's culpability must exceed what is needed
to show intentional discrimination."'9 The appellate court further
concluded that there must be a showing of 'egregious.' wrongdoing
on the part of the defendant for a punitive damage award to be
warranted. 97 The appellate court ruled that the plaintiff had failed
to present sufficient evidence to make this showing of egregious-
ness.98 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case to resolve
a split in the circuits over whether a showing of egregious conduct
is necessary for a punitive damage claim to go to the jury.99 In
analyzing the damages provision of Title VII, the Court noted that
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 limits punitive awards to cases where
the plaintiff has demonstrated that the discrimination was "inten-
tional."'100 The Court rejected the lower court's conclusion, however,
that a plaintiff must show that the intentional discrimination
involved in the case was also egregious in nature.10' Looking to the
plain terms of the statute, the Court noted that the text does not
91. Id. at 531.
92. Id. at 530.
93. Id. at 532.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 533 (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
97. Id. (quoting Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 965).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 534.
101. Id. at 534-35.
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require a demonstration of an employer's outrageous behavior. 0 2
Rather, the statute focuses on only "an employer's state of mind."' 3
The Court acknowledged, however, that not all cases of inten-
tional discrimination warrant an instruction on exemplary
damages. °4 Instead, the statute requires a showing that the de-
fendant acted with "malice or with reckless indifference to the
[plaintiff's] federally protected rights."0 5 This requirement relates
to "the employer's knowledge that it may be acting in violation of
federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimina-
tion."'0° The Court went on to explain that a plaintiff can show
malice or reckless indifference by demonstrating that the employer
"discriminate [d] in the face of a perceived risk that its actions
[would] violate federal law."10' 7 The Court acknowledged that by
requiring this showing it was narrowing the cases of intentional
discrimination in which exemplary relief would be appropriate, and
noted that "[t]here will be circumstances where intentional dis-
crimination does not give rise to punitive damages liability."' ' In
addition to demonstrating malice or reckless indifference, the Court
also held that the victim must impute liability for exemplary relief
to the defendant.0 9 Referring to the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, the Court advised that punitive liability is imputed in those
cases in which "an employee serving in a 'managerial capacity'
committed the wrong while 'acting in the scope of employment.""'0
Even in those cases in which punitive damages are imputed to the
employer, however, the defendant can avoid liability by demonstrat-
ing that it has engaged in "good faith efforts at Title VII compli-
ance.""' Such good faith efforts can be demonstrated, for example,
where the employer has effectively maintained and implemented
a policy or program attempting to prevent discrimination." 2 By
102. Id. at 535.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 535-37.
105. Id. at 535 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994)) (emphasis omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 536.
108. Id. For example, though intentionally discriminating, the employer may not be aware
that such discrimination violates federal law. Id. at 537.
109. Id. at 539.
110. Id. at 543 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2176 (1957)).
111. Id. at 544.
112. Id. at 544-45.
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allowing this employer defense, the Supreme Court attempted to
"promote prevention as well as remediation" and thereby effectuate
the "purposes underlying Title VII."'' In conclusion, in light of the
new standards that it announced on the issue of punitive damages,
the Court vacated the appellate court's order and remanded the
case.1
B. Interpreting Kolstad
The Kolstad decision is important, as it is the Supreme Court's
clearest statement on the standard necessary to establish a punitive
damages claim pursuant to Title VII.15 Nonetheless, there has been
significant confusion in the lower courts over how exactly to apply
this standard.1 6 This uncertainty is likely caused by the fact that
the Supreme Court did not define certain critical terms in its
analysis, such as "managerial capacity" and "good faith efforts."" 7
In Davey v. Lockheed Martin Corporation,"' the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals provided perhaps the best and clearest interpretation
of Kolstad to date, boiling the decision down to a three-part
framework." 9 Under the Davey test, a plaintiff may seek exem-
plary relief if the defendant "acted with knowledge that its actions
113. Id. at 545-46.
114. Id. at 546.
115. See Harold S. Lewis, Jr., Walking the Walk of Plain Text: The Supreme Court's
Markedly More Solicitous Treatment of Title VIIFollowing the Civil Rights Act of 1991,49 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 1081, 1083 (2005) (noting that in Kolstad the Supreme Court "adopted a
traditional, moderate standard governing the recovery of punitive damages for Title VII
actions").
116. See Jonathan C. Hancock & John B. Starnes, Revisiting Kolstad v. American Dental
Association Reform of Punitive Damages Awards in Employment Discrimination Cases Since
the Supreme Court Adopted the Standard of Malice or Reckless Indifference, 31 U. MEM. L.
REV. 641, 658 (2001) (noting that even after Kolstad, "questions surrounding the punitive
damage awards still remain"); Kim J. Askew, Punitive Damages Kolstad v. American Dental
Association, WL VPB0919 ALI-ABA 501, 525 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Sept. 19,2000) ("The
circuits have been somewhat inconsistent in analyzing when a claim of intentional
discrimination fails to give rise to punitive damages.").
117. See Amy L. Blaisdell, Note, A New Standard of Employer Liability Emerges: Kolstad
v. American Dental Association Addresses Vicarious Liability in Punitive Damages, 44 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 1561, 1602-03 (2000) ("The Court gave very vague guidance as to what it means
to act in a 'managerial capacity,' and as to what types of employer activities will constitute
'good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.').
118. 301 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2002).
119. Id. at 1208-09.
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violated federal law."'2 ° Next, the plaintiff must show that the
worker who acted against the plaintiff "is a managerial agent who
acted within the scope of employment.'' 121 Finally, the defendant can
avoid punitive damages by proving its good faith.'22 Even in Davey,
however, the court expressed confusion over how the good faith
standard should be applied, and also noted that the question of
which party bears the burden of proof on this issue remains
unresolved.'23
The academic scholarship is mixed on the effect of Kolstad. Some
have argued that the decision was an enormous victory for employ-
ers, and that by permitting companies to avoid punitive damages
for the unlawful conduct of their managerial employees "without
establishing a clear good-faith-effort standard, the Court rendered
Title VII's most powerful deterrent mechanism-punitive dam-
ages-ineffectual."'24 By failing to consider the "broader purpose" of
Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Supreme Court did
not recognize that potential liability for punitive damages "could
spur employers to work tirelessly to prevent unlawful discrimina-
tion in their workplaces."125 Even employer defense firms announced
that companies "can breathe a bit easier" after the decision. 2 '
Others have taken a contrary view of the decision. One commen-
tator suggested that Kolstad "created more continuity than change
and more opportunity than limitation for plaintiffs to be awarded
120. Id. at 1208.
121. Id. at 1208-09.
122. Id. at 1209.
123. Id. at 1209 & n.4.
124. See Leading Cases, supra note 11, at 359-60; see also Ann M. Anderson, Note, Whose
Malice Counts? Kolstad and the Limits of Vicarious Liability for Title VII Punitive Damages,
78 N.C. L. REv. 799, 804-05 (2000) (arguing that the Kolstad decision "will prevent appro-
priate punitive damage awards in cases in which courts are unwilling to interpret Kolstad
with a view toward Title VII's enforcement goals").
125. See Leading Cases, supra note 11, at 368; see also Andrew Weissmann & David
Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411,437 (2007) ("In Kolstad,
the Court limited vicarious liability agency principles to shield employers from liability for
punitive damages under Title VII.").
126. See Leading Cases, supra note 11, at 366 (quoting High Court Ends Term with
Important Rulings on ADA, Punitive Damages, PA. EMP. L. LETTER (Buchanan Ingersoll), July
1999, at 4); see also Andrea A. Kirshenbaum, Comment, Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n"
The Opportunity for Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 3 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 617, 618-19 (2001) (discussing views that the Kolstad decision would greatly benefit
employers).
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punitive damages."'27 Another further maintained that while the
effects of Kolstad would largely depend upon how it is applied, the
decision "may mean that most employers sued under Title VII will
face paying thousands of dollars in punitive damages.""12 And it has
even been suggested that the standard enunciated by the Court
"makes no sense."'29 The confusion in the lower courts over how to
apply the Kolstad case, combined with the conflicting views in the
academic literature regarding the impact of the Supreme Court's
decision, leave much uncertainty over the effectiveness of punitive
damages in deterring discriminatory behavior. A study of the
decisions that followed Kolstad is therefore necessary to help shed
light on whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provided an effective
remedial structure.
IV. THE FALSE PROMISE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES: AN EXAMINATION
OF DISTRICT COURT CASES
The addition of punitive and compensatory damages to Title VII
"altered the landscape" of civil rights law; it was believed that this
relief would "deter discrimination" and provide "greater protection
to victims of intentional discrimination."'30 Subsequent Supreme
Court case law interpreting the statute, however, combined with an
unreceptive welcome of punitive damage awards in the lower courts,
has called into question the effectiveness of this form of relief with
regard to the broader goal of eliminating discrimination. 3 ' An
analysis of all available district court cases during the calendar
years of 2004 and 2005 demonstrates just how infrequently punitive
damages find their way into published opinions as a remedy for
discrimination. Though the perception in our society is often that
"punitive damages are out of control," resulting in a "crisis" of the
judicial system, the reality is far different, at least as these damages
relate to cases of employment discrimination.'32
127. Kirshenbaum, supra note 126, at 644-45.
128. Schiffner, supra note 14, at 195-96.
129. See Blaisdell, supra note 117, at 1605.
130. See Levi, supra note 13, at 596.
131. See, e.g., Ruggles, supra note 8, at 154-55 ("Judging from the level of recidivism, the
[1991 CRA], with its caps on damages, has not achieved its goal of eliminating the persistent
problem of employment discrimination.").
132. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr.,A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages,
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A. Methodology
For this study, I analyzed all available federal district court cases
addressing Title VII punitive damages for the calendar years of
2004 and 2005. This included all federal district court cases, both
published and unpublished, that appeared in the Westlaw federal
district court database, narrowed by a search term that limited
the analysis to any case referencing both Title VII and punitive
damages."' 3 The search revealed a total of 676 federal district court
cases for these two years that referenced both punitive damages and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.13
I chose to perform the study based on the results in the Westlaw
database as this is one of the most comprehensive and frequently
used legal search engines.'35 Thus, in determining how significant
of a deterrent effect punitive damages have had in the employ-
ment discrimination context, this database would contain the vast
majority of cases of which those in the legal or corporate community
would be aware.13 1 In greater detail below, I also compare the
results of my search to a similar search that I had performed in a
different database. 137 I selected the years 2004 and 2005 for this
study as a result of several different factors. First, these years are
far enough removed from the Supreme Court's decision in Kolstad
to allow the appellate courts and district courts to have digested
and interpreted the decision's meaning. Second, as over two years
have passed since December 31, 2005 (the end date for cases
72 VA. L. REV. 139, 139 (1986) (commenting on the "explosion in punitive judgments" in the
mass tort and products liability contexts).
133. The specific search that I ran in the Westlaw federal district court database ("DC'F')
was as follows: DA(AFTER 1/1/2004) & DA(BEFORE 1/1/2006) & 'TITLE VII" & "PUNITIVE
DAMAGES."
134. The total of 676 cases was accurate as of the date I completed this study, December
3, 2007. Westlaw does occasionally add cases to its database for various reasons, and it is
possible that the total number of cases uncovered by my search will increase over time.
135. The common usage and easy accessibility of this database also allow the results of my
study to be easily duplicated by others in the academic community.
136. It is not uncommon to perform a numerical study based on this type of frequently
searched legal database. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a
Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 734-35 (2006) (performing numerical analysis of disparate
impact litigation in employment discrimination cases based upon a search in the analogous
Lexis database).
137. See infra Part IV.D (discussing results of a search limited to jury verdicts in Title VII
cases over the 2004-2005 time period).
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analyzed as part of this study), a sufficient amount of time has
passed to determine (for the most part) how the appellate courts
have treated any district court punitive damage award that might
have been challenged on appeal."8 Finally, the years analyzed are
recent enough to capture any current trends in punitive relief in the
courts.
In reviewing each case, I catalogued whether the district court
awarded punitive damages pursuant to Title VII in the matter. I
took as broad of a view of "awarded punitive damages" as possible,
including even those cases, for example, in which the district court
referenced an earlier opinion awarding punitive damages, but the
examined opinion itself addressed only a fees issue. 139 In addition,
in those instances in which there was an award of punitive dam-
ages, I tracked the particular amount of the award. I did not
catalogue those cases in which there was a punitive damage award
outside of the Title VII context, for example, those cases that only
awarded punitive damages pursuant to the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1991.140 Also not included in the totals are those
published opinions in which a district court vacated a jury's award
138. In the two instances where district court punitive damage awards were vacated after
2005, the cases were included in the numerical totals. See infra note 143 (discussing the Allen
and Gaskins decisions).
139. See, e.g., Firestine v. Parkview Health Sys., 374 F. Supp. 2d 658, 661-62 (N.D. Ind.
2005) (discussing the appropriateness of attorney fees and costs with reference to a Title VII
retaliation case in which the jury awarded $40,315 in punitive damages to the plaintiff).
Categorizing the cases was somewhat of a subjective process, and I attempted to be as
inclusive as possible with my analysis. Compare Watson v. E.S. Sutton, Inc., No. 02-Civ.-2739,
2005 WL 2170659, at **1, 15, 24 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005) (awarding $717,000 in punitive
damages in a Title VII retaliation case under city law, amount included in study case totals
because of tenor of decision regarding Title VII), with Pollard v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours &
Co., No. 95-3010, 2003 WL 23849733 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 22,2003), modified by 2004 WL 784489
(W.D. Tenn. Feb. 24, 2004) (punitive damage award not included in study case totals where
award was made pursuant to state law rather than Title VII).
140. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000); see, e.g., Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 03-3843,
2005 WL 1521407, at **1-3 (E.D.N.Y. June 21, 2005) (reducing $5 million punitive damage
jury award to statutory cap of $300,000 in ADA case); Young v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No.
01-0299-C-MIS, 2004 WL 2538639, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 19, 2004) (reducing a $4.5 million
punitive damages award to $200,000 in an ADA case). In certain instances, there was a fine
line to be drawn between whether punitive damages were awarded pursuant to state or city
law or pursuant to Title VII. As part of the analysis, I attempted to include only those cases
in which the court awarded damages, at least in part, pursuant to Title VII, though in some
instances this calculation was difficult to perform. See supra note 139.
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of punitive relief.'41 Additionally, the study focused primarily on
district court cases. Thus, I also included any case in which punitive
damages may have been subsequently vacated on appeal, 4 ' if the
appellate decision was issued after December 31, 2005.11
B. Results of Study
Over the period of 2004-2005, approximately 36,676 employment
law cases were filed in all of the federal district courts in the United
States. 14 4 A search in the Westlaw database for the calendar years
of 2004 and 2005 revealed 676 federal district court opinions-both
published and unpublished-that referenced both Title VII and
punitive damages.' After analyzing each of these cases, I concluded
that twenty-four decisions included opinions where a district court
either awarded punitive damages under Title VII or upheld a jury's
award. The breakdown per year is illustrated in Table A below: I
found nine cases awarding punitive damages issued in 2004 and
141. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Kan. Farm Bureau Servs., 355 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1195-96 (D. Kan.
2005) (vacating a $20,000 jury award for punitive damages in a Title VII gender
discrimination case).
142. As the focus of the study was on district court decisions, I did not track subsequent
appeals in those cases in which the court awarded no punitive damages. The appellate process
was monitored for those district court decisions that resulted in a punitive award during the
2004-2005 timeframe.
143. See Gaskins v. BFI Waste Servs. LLC, No. 02-1832, 2005 WL 1667737, at *20 (E.D.
Va. June 17, 2005) (awarding $1,200,000 in punitive relief), punitive damage award vacated
sub nom., White v. BFI Waste Servs., Nos. 05-1804, 05-1837, 2006 WL 1443444 (4th Cir. May
23, 2006); Allen v. Tobacco Superstore, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 796, 809 (E.D. Ark. 2005)
(awarding $75,000 in punitive damages in a Title VII race discrimination and retaliation
case), punitive damage award vacated, 475 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2007). The Allen and Gaskins
decisions are the only cases in which I am aware of an appellate court subsequently vacating
a district court's punitive damage award issued pursuant to Title VII during 2004 or 2005 (at
least as of the conclusion of the study on December 3, 2007). I kept these decisions in the
totals for Table A as the awards were not vacated until after the two year timeframe
considered for the study. Cf. Johnson v. Spencer Press of Me., 364 F.3d 368, 377-78 (1st Cir.
2004) (declining to address the punitive damages issue because compensatory damages were
sufficient to exhaust the statutory cap; district court case, No. 02-73-P-H, 2004 WL 1859791
(D. Me. Aug. 19, 2004), was included in the 2004 study totals).
144. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDIcIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, supra note 17, at tbl.C-2A (2005) (between Oct. 1, 2003, and Sept. 30, 2004, 19,746
suits were filed; between Oct. 1, 2004, and Sept. 30, 2005, 16,930 suits were filed).
145. A number of these cases were outside of the Title VII context, but the text of the
district court's decision still utilized these terms. Similarly, a number of the decisions resulted
in a judgment for the defendant, thus the plaintiff received no relief in the case.
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fifteen cases in 2005.146 The case names, citations, and punitive
damage award amounts are on file with the author. Of the twenty-
four total cases awarding exemplary relief, the mean award was
$212,471.67 and the median award was $62,500.00.147 That only
twenty-four available employment discrimination cases over a two-
year-period awarded punitive damages seems somewhat low in light
of Congress's intent to provide a more effective deterrent by making
the remedy available.
148
146. One case, Ciesielski v. Hooters Management Corp., issued decisions relevant to the
punitive damage award in both 2004 and 2005. See Ciesielski v. Hooters Mgmt. Corp., No. 03
C 1175,2005 WL 608245, at **4-5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2005); Ciesielski v. Hooters Mgmt. Corp.,
No. 03 C 1175, 2004 WL 2997648, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2004). As the later decision in this
case denied a motion to reconsider the sufficiency of the evidence on the punitive damages
question, the case was included in the 2005 totals. Ciesielski, 2005 WL 608245 at **4-5.
147. There are readily identifiable reasons for why the means and medians appear so high
in these totals. In some instances, awards were made on behalf of multiple parties. See, e.g.,
Millazzo v. Universal Traffic Serv., Inc., No. Civ. 01-B-880, 2004 WL 3480982, at *3 (D. Colo.
Aug. 24, 2004) (awarding two plaintiffs punitive damages in the amounts of $35,000 and
$45,000 in a Title VII case). In other instances, awards were made pursuant to statutes that
do not have the same statutory cap restrictions as Title VII. In those instances in which the
awards were made pursuant to multiple statutes, the amount of the awards were not
apportioned between Title VII and the other statute(s) if the amounts could not be separated
out. Cf. Watson v. E.S. Sutton, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 2739, 2005 WL 2170659, at **1, 15, 24
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005) (awarding $717,000 in punitive damages in a Title VII retaliation
case also brought under New York state and city laws-though the punitive award was made
pursuant to city law, the full amount was included in the study's case totals).
148. See, e.g., Levi, supra note 13, at 596 (discussing the role of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
in employment discrimination law).
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Table A
Year Number of Number of Cases Mean Median
Cases Awarding Punitive Punitive
Analyzed Punitive Damage Damage
Damages Award Award
2004 261 9 $98,778.33 $50,000.00
2005 415 15 $267,354.33 $75,000.00
Total 676 24 $204,138.33 $62,500.00
C. Weaknesses of Analysis
Concededly, this analysis yields imperfect and imprecise results
from a purely numeric standpoint. When approaching the numbers
that this study yields, we must consider the potential weaknesses
of the data gathered. In particular, the search performed cannot
capture those cases for which there was no opinion issued in the
district court. Additionally, the analysis does not identify the
deterrent effect of any employment discrimination cases brought in
state courts that resulted in a punitive damage award. Also, it is
impossible to catalogue how many cases would have resulted in a
punitive damage award that were otherwise settled by the parties.
And, though unlikely, it is possible that a particular decision
awarded punitive damages pursuant to Title VII without specifically
using the search terms utilized by the study.
Finally, this study would be significantly strengthened through
a comparison of (1) those Title VII cases in which judgment was
entered in favor of the plaintiff and no punitive damages were
awarded with (2) those Title VII cases in which judgment was
entered in favor of the plaintiff and punitive damages were
awarded. This comparison would help reveal how frequently the
courts award punitive damages in cases in which the plaintiff
establishes discrimination. Unfortunately, obtaining an accurate
number of Title VII cases in which judgment was entered in
favor of the plaintiff and no punitive damages were awarded is a
difficult (if not impossible) task using the Westlaw database. Many
judgments are entered by the courts without a published opinion,
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and acquiring an accurate number of plaintiff judgments to use as
a comparator during the 2004-2005 timeframe proved elusive.
Nonetheless, with the assistance of a separate database, I was able
to obtain substantive data in this regard.
D. Analysis Conducted in a Different Database
In addition to the study that I conducted on punitive damages
through the use of Westlaw, I was able to gain access to another
large database containing federal district court jury awards in an
attempt to determine the frequency with which exemplary relief is
awarded in employment discrimination cases. This additional
analysis was performed, at my request, by Jury Verdict Research,
Palm Beach Gardens, Florida (JVR), a company that traces and
analyzes national litigation trends.149 The results of their analysis
largely confirmed the results of my individual study.
1. Jury Verdict Research Methodology
JVR maintains a large database on jury verdicts in employment
discrimination cases through information that it gathers from
independent contractors who research court files, as well as reports
provided by plaintiff and defense attorneys. 50 JVR acknowledges
that it "does not receive 100 percent of the jury verdicts rendered
nationwide," but maintains "that its sample is sufficient to produce
descriptive statistics for ... employment practice litigation."'' JVR
further states that the verdicts are gathered "in an impartial
manner, with an equal emphasis on plaintiff and defense verdicts
and settlements, and with no intentional bias toward extreme
awards or geographic regions." 52
149. See About Jury Verdict Research, http://www.juryverdictresearch.com/AboutJVR/
aboutjvr.html [hereinafter JVR Website] (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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2. Results of Jury Verdict Research's Analysis
I asked that JVR search its nationwide database to determine the
number of Title VII jury verdicts awarding punitive damages during
2004 and 2005, and the mean and median of those awards. The
database contains information as to jury verdicts, but does not
identify the actual amount of the award (if any) subsequently
ordered by the district court."5 3 The search revealed that there were
only fifty-two jury verdicts awarding punitive damages during 2004
and 2005 in Title VII federal district court cases.5 4 Though this
result is approximately twice the number of cases identified by my
study, it is still a relatively small figure given the expansive nature
of the search.
The JVR search also revealed a median punitive damages award
of $282,500.00 and a mean award of $1,322,163.46.55 As these
numbers represent jury awards only, they would not have been
adjusted to reflect any statutory caps that the district court may
later have imposed to comply with the limits of Title VII 156 or any
other adjustments made by the courts. A summary of this data is set
forth in Table B below. The case names, docket numbers, and award
amounts in each case are on file with the author.
153. E-mail from Jury Verdict Research Associate to Joseph A. Seiner, Assistant Professor
of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law (July 27, 2007, 14:33:40 EST) [hereinafter
JVR data] (on file with author).
154. Id.
155. See id.; see also E-mail from Jury Verdict Research Associate to Joseph A. Seiner,
Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law (Aug. 6, 2007,
10:30:30 EST) (on file with author) (confirming mean and median punitive damage awards
for 2004 and 2005).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000).
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Table B
Year Number of Mean Punitive Median Punitive
Juries Awarding Damage Award Damage Award
Punitive
Damages
2004 24 $1,204,916.67 $325,000.00
2005 28 $1,422,660.71 $245,000.00
Total 52 $1,322,163.46 $282,500.00
Moreover, the results of the JVR search revealed that 291 Title
VII employment discrimination cases ultimately resulted in a jury
verdict during 2004-2005.57 Of these 291 jury verdicts, 177 were in
favor of plaintiffs. 58 Thus, slightly less than 18 percent (52/291) of
those Title VII cases that went to a jury during this timeframe
resulted in a punitive damage award by the jury, and approximately
29 percent (52/177) of those juries that found in favor of the plaintiff
also awarded punitive damages."8 9 These numbers are set forth in
Table C below:
157. See E-mail from Jury Verdict Research Associate to Joseph A. Seiner, Assistant
Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law (Sept. 20, 2007, 15:44:41 EST)
(on file with author). These 291 cases reflect any case in which a jury rendered a verdict in
a case in which a Title VII claim was originally brought. Id. Thus, a jury verdict was not
necessarily rendered in these cases specifically pursuant to Title VII (and may even have been
rendered pursuant to another statute instead). JVR "doles] not track whether the award
rendered was specific to Title VII in cases where there were multiple claims." Id.
158. See E-mail from Managing Editor, Jury Verdict Research, to Joseph A. Seiner,
Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law (Dec. 11, 2007,
20:01:38 EST) (on file with author). These 177 cases reflect those lawsuits in which there was
a Title VII claim in the case and a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff. Id. As JVR does not
track verdicts rendered specifically under Title VII in those cases in which there are multiple
claims in the suit, it is possible that some of these plaintiff verdicts were made pursuant to
another claim in the case (rather than pursuant to Title VII). Id.
159. It is possible, however, that the district court may have taken the punitive damage
issue away from the jury in some of these cases.
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Table C
Year Number of Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage
Title VII Title VII all Title VII Title VII of Title VII
Jury Jury Juries Award- Verdicts for Plaintiff
Verdicts Verdicts ing Punitive the Plaintiff Verdicts
Awarding Damages Awarding
Punitive Punitive
Damages Damages
2004 139 24 17.27% 89 26.97%
2005 152 28 18.42% 88 31.82%
Total 291 52 17.87% 177 29.38%
3. Rationale for Differences in Results
It is worth briefly exploring why there is a differential of cases
identified by the two separate analyses. It is not surprising that
my study would identify fewer cases of punitive relief awarded
than the JVR search. Under my approach, I identified twenty-four
decisions in which a district court either awarded punitive damages
under Title VII or upheld a jury's award. 6 ° The JVR analysis,
which identified fifty-two cases awarding punitive relief, provides a
different measurement, as it exclusively examines jury verdicts.'
16
Thus, the JVR measurement includes those cases in which an
award may have been vacated by the district court.6 2 Additionally,
the jury verdicts identified by JVR include all cases in which a Title
160. See supra Part IV.B (discussing my results from an analysis of federal district court
Title VII decisions).
161. See JVR data, supra note 153 (listing jury verdicts awarding punitive relief in federal
district court Title VII cases).
162. For example, JVR included in its results the case of Goico v. Boeing Co., Doc. No. 02-
1420 (D. Kan. 2004). See id. Though my search identified two Goico decisions, this case was
not included in my totals as the district court did not ultimately award the exemplary relief
found by the jury. See Goico v. Boeing Co., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (D. Kan. 2005); Goico v.
Boeing Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 986 (D. Kan. 2004). In Goico, the court awarded $300,000 in
compensatory relief which satisfied the statutory cap, thereby making the question of punitive
relief moot. See Goico, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 1031 ('In keeping with the limitation on damages
in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, the judgment entered by the court included the aforementioned
$300,000 [of compensatory reliefl, representing the permissible limit for both compensatory
and punitive damages.").
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VII claim was brought."3 Thus, the punitive damages identified in
the JVR cases were not necessarily awarded pursuant to Title VII
in those cases in which there were other statutory bases for the
lawsuit." In contrast, my individual study only identifies cases in
which a punitive damage award was made pursuant to Title VII. 65
Additionally, the JVR database likely includes some decisions that
are not available on Westlaw. This is because the cases in the JVR
database are gathered by a different means than Westlaw--JVR
relies on workers that research court files, as well as reports
provided by attorneys.166 And, as the Westlaw federal district court
database relies on decisions provided by the various federal courts,
this database may also include cases not available to JVR.'67
Finally, it is worth noting that while both studies examined cases
during 2004-2005, the time periods analyzed are actually somewhat
different. This is because there would be a time lag between when
a jury renders its verdict (under the JVR analysis), and when a
district court actually issues a published opinion (under the
Westlaw approach).
While these differences represent only a difference in methodolo-
gies, the results are markedly similar. My purpose in obtaining the
JVR analysis was to determine whether my results were in some
way flawed or unrepresentative. The JVR search, which was more
expansive in the types of cases that it included while being per-
formed over a similar time period, also identified very few instances
of jury verdicts awarding punitive damage relief in Title VII cases,
and revealed that slightly less than 18 percent of all Title VII jury
verdicts result in a punitive damage award and that less than 30
percent of juries finding in favor of the plaintiff also award punitive
relief. This additional analysis therefore largely confirms my study
163. See E-mail from Jury Verdict Research Associate, supra note 157.
164. For example, JVR included in its results Roberts v. County of Cook, Doc. No. 01-C-9373
(N.D. Ill. 2004). See JVR data, supra note 153. My analysis identified this case as well, but
it was not included in my overall results because the jury's punitive damage award was made
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than the plaintiffs Title VII claims. See Roberts v.
County of Cook, No. 01-C-9373, 2004 WL 1088230, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2004).
165. See supra Part IVA (discussing the methodology of my punitive damages study).
166. See JVR Website, supra note 149.
167. See generally E-mail from Jury Verdict Research Associate to Joseph A. Seiner,
Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law (Aug. 6, 2007,
10:30:30 EST) (on file with author) (indicating that JVR utilizes Westlaw, but that JVR may
not include all Westlaw cases in its database).
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and also calls into question the effectiveness of exemplary relief
in employment discrimination cases.
E. District Courts Erect Additional Barriers to Punitive Relief
In addition to the data my analysis reveals, my review of the
district court decisions uncovered other issues of critical importance.
A number of district court decisions vacated punitive damage jury
awards in Title VII cases.168 Also, three recent appellate court
employment discrimination decisions reveal that the lower courts
may not be allowing the question of exemplary relief to get to the
jury, even when such relief may be warranted.169
1. District Courts Vacate Awards
My research revealed a number of cases in which the district
courts either reduced or vacated a punitive damage award. For
example, in Wirtz v. Kansas Farm Bureau Services,7 ° the district
court vacated a $20,000 punitive damage jury award in a Title VII
gender discrimination case. 7' Relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in Kolstad, the district court essentially took the issue away
from the jury and concluded on its own that the defendant's actions
did not "amount to malicious and willful disregard of plaintiffs
protected rights.1 72 The court further concluded that the defendant
had not "ignore[d] its established [antidiscrimination] policies and
procedures," had "fully investigated" the violations of which it had
knowledge, and had thus "demonstrated that it complied in good
faith with Title VII."' 73 Therefore, the district court granted the
defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law following a
168. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Kan. Farm Bureau Servs., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1225 (D. Kan.
2004); Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 96-RRA-3257-M, 2004 WL 5138005, at **1, 9-10 (N.D.
Ala. Mar. 26,2004); Hardman v. Autozone, Inc., No. 02-2291-KHV, 2004 WL 303268, at *8 (D.
Kan. Feb. 11, 2004).
169. See E.E.O.C. v. Stocks, Inc., No. 06-10871, 2007 WL 1119186, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 16,
2007); E.E.O.C. v. Heartway Corp., 466 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 2006); McDonough v. City
of Quincy, 452 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2006).
170. 311 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Kan. 2004).
171. Id. at 1224-25.
172. Id. at 1222-23.
173. Id. at 1225.
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jury's verdict awarding exemplary relief, holding that such an
"imposition of punitive damages would be improper. '174
Moreover, in Ash v. Tyson Foods,'75 a district court awarded
judgment as a matter of law to the defendant on claims of promotion
discrimination brought by two plaintiffs that had yielded jury
verdicts of $1.5 million each in punitive damages.' In vacating the
awards, the district court ruled that one of the plaintiffs had failed
to show sufficient evidence of pretext for the employer's asserted
nondiscriminatory reason, and that a second plaintiff had not dem-
onstrated that any intentional discrimination had occurred.177 The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed as to one of the plain-
tiffs, holding that the district court's alternative ruling of a new trial
was the more appropriate result.'78 In a per curiam opinion, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed and vacated the appellate court's order,
criticizing the lower court's treatment of discriminatory language
and its consideration of the plaintiffs' qualifications as compared
to the selected candidates.' 79 On remand, the Eleventh Circuit,
applying the standards adopted by the Supreme Court, decided to
"reinstate the previous holdings of [its] decision," effectively elim-
inating the entire $3 million of punitive relief originally awarded by
the jury. i8 ° In addition, in Hardman v. AutoZone, Inc.,181 a jury
awarded the plaintiff $87,500 in punitive damages in a Title VII
racial harassment case.'82 The case involved egregious facts, as the
plaintiff was subjected to derogatory racial name calling and was
even exposed to a co-worker attempting to scare him by pretending
to be a member of the Ku Klux Klan. 83 The plaintiff also received
and reported to the police personal threats regarding himself and
his family which a coworker made."s Because of an improper jury
instruction, the exemplary relief was vacated by the district court,
174. Id.
175. No. 96-RRA-3257-M, 2004 WL 5138005 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 26, 2004).
176. Id. at *1.
177. Id. at **9-10.
178. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 04-11695, 2005 WL 902044 (11th Cir. Apr. 19, 2005).
179. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006).
180. No. 04-11695, 2006 WL 2219749 (11th Cir. Aug. 2, 2006), reh'g denied, 213 F. App'x
973 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 127 S. Ct. 1154 (2007).
181. No. 02-2291-KHV, 2004 WL 303268 (D. Kan. Feb. 11, 2004).
182. Id. at *1.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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and a new trial was ordered on the harassment allegation both on
the issues of liability and the appropriate damages.
18 5
The Wirtz, Ash, and Hardman decisions are excellent illustra-
tions of the difficulties plaintiffs often face with maintaining a
punitive damage jury award in an employment discrimination
matter. And, even where a district court allows punitive damages to
stand in a Title VII case, 186 the court can reduce such an award,
8 7
or a court of appeals may subsequently reduce or vacate the award.
For example, in one of the cases analyzed as part of my study, Allen
v. Tobacco Superstore, Inc.,88 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
vacated a $75,000 punitive damage award in a race discrimination
and retaliation case because it concluded that there was not
sufficient evidence of malice or reckless indifference on the part
of the defendant.8 9 Similarly, in Gaskins v. BFI Waste Services,"o
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a $600,000 punitive
damage award-already reduced from the $2 million awarded by
the jury-because it found insufficient evidence to support any
exemplary relief in the case. 9 Simply convincing a jury of reckless
or malicious conduct on the part of the employer is therefore not
enough, as the courts often intervene to alter any punitive relief
that is awarded.
2. Courts Refuse To Give Punitive Damage Question to Jury
Moreover, it is entirely possible that a number of courts are not
even permitting punitive damage claims to go to juries in the first
instance. Though it would be difficult, if not impossible, to track the
number of cases in which a district court declined to give a jury
185. Id. at **8-9.
186. In addition to cases involving Title VII, there are also likely civil rights cases brought
pursuant to different statutes in which the district courts vacate awards of exemplary relief.
See generally Webber v. Int'l Paper Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 160 (D. Me. 2004) (vacating relief in
a discrimination case brought pursuant to Maine Human Rights Act, not Title VII).
187. See, e.g., Hines v. Grand Casino of La., 358 F. Supp. 2d 533, 539, 548-53 (W.D. La.
2005) (reducing a $200,000 punitive damage award in sexual harassment and constructive
discharge case to $170,000 to adhere to the statutory caps and then remitting the amount to
$30,000).
188. 475 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2007).
189. Id. at 942-43.
190. Nos. 05-1804, 05-1837, 2006 WL 1443444 (4th Cir. May 23, 2006).
191. Id. at *1.
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instruction on exemplary relief, three recent appellate decisions in
employment discrimination cases are informative on this issue.
First, in EEOC v. Stocks, Inc.,'92 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered whether the district court had properly refused
to give a punitive damage instruction in a retaliation case brought
under Title VII.' 93 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that she was
improperly disciplined and ultimately terminated after she com-
plained of sexual harassment that she was experiencing as a
restaurant waitress.' Though the evidence demonstrated that the
decisionmakers at the restaurant "had knowledge of federal anti-
discrimination laws and were aware of their duty not to retaliate
against an employee who brought a sexual harassment complaint,"
the district court refused to let the punitive damage issue go to the
jury. 95 In an unpublished decision, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court, holding that "the jury could have found that [the
restaurant's] decisionmakers were aware of their responsibilities
under Title VII and acted in the face of a perceived risk that their
actions would violate the statute. ' 96
Similarly, in McDonough v. City of Quincy,'97 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals considered whether a district court erred in failing
to give a jury a punitive damage instruction in a case where a police
officer maintained that he was retaliated against for providing
assistance in another employee's sexual harassment suit against
the city. 9 ' Though the district court would not allow the issue of
exemplary relief to go to the jury, the First Circuit reversed, holding
192. No. 06-10871, 2007 WL 1119186 (5th Cir. Apr. 16, 2007). The author served as lead
counsel in the Stocks case on behalf of the EEOC. The views expressed in this Article are
those of the author and do not represent the views of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission or of the United States.
193. Id. at **1-2.
194. Id. at *1.
195. Id. at **1-2. The restaurant owner demonstrated his knowledge of the relevant law
by testifying that he did not take any action against the plaintiff subsequent to an earlier
complaint because "she would have gone to the EEOC." Id.
196. Id. at *3. Because the court believed that the issue of punitive damages was
"intertwined" with the finding of liability in the case, the court did not believe that there could
be a separate trial limited to the question of exemplary relief. Id. The court therefore left "to
the EEOC the choice of whether it wants a new trial on all issues, or wishes instead to retain
its judgment." Id.
197. 452 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2006).
198. Id. at 13-14.
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that the trier of fact should have been allowed to consider whether
the city was acting with malice or reckless indifference.199 In support
of this reversal, the appellate court noted that the jury had already
rejected the legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation that the city
gave for its actions when it found for the plaintiff on the retaliation
claim.2 °0 The First Circuit also emphasized that the police depart-
ment was aware of its legal obligations as a result of its own
published policy and training, and that the retaliating officials were
all senior level employees with management responsibilities.20 '
Finally, in EEOC v. Heartway Corp.,"2 the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed whether a district court had properly refused
to give a punitive damage instruction to the jury in a case brought
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).203 The defendant,
a nursing center operator, terminated a cook at their facility after
finding out that she suffered from Hepatitis C.2°4 The district court
refused to allow the issue of punitive damages to go to the jury,
despite the fact that the nursing facility administrator asked an
EEOC investigator how he would 'like to eat food containing her
blood," and further stated that there would be a "mass exodus" if the
nursing center clients found out about the plaintiffs condition.20 5 In
reversing the district court's ruling, the Tenth Circuit held that
testimony presented at trial-revealing that the facility administra-
tor had received training on the ADA and knew that it was illegal
to terminate someone because of a disability-was sufficient to
allow a jury to determine whether the administrator "acted with
knowledge" that he was violating the law.20 6
These decisions represent only three recent cases in which a
district court has not permitted the issue of punitive damages to go
to the jury in an employment discrimination matter---only to later
199. Id. at 23-24.
200. Id. at 23.
201. Id.
202. 466 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2006). The author served as lead counsel in the Heartway
case on behalf of the EEOC. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and
do not represent the views of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or of the
United States.
203. Id. at 1158-59.
204. Id. at 1159. The nursing center administrator maintained that the plaintiff was
terminated for falsifying information on an employment application. Id.
205. Id. at 1160-61.
206. Id. at 1169.
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be overturned by an appellate court. Although there are likely many
other district courts that have similarly declined to permit the issue
of exemplary relief to reach the trier of fact, determining the exact
number of such decisions would be extremely difficult (if not
impossible). Many similar decisions could have been made orally by
a district court-without the benefit of a published opinion-and not
subsequently challenged on appeal.
Regardless of how many similar cases exist, however, Stocks,
Inc., McDonough, and Heartway demonstrate a reluctance of some
district courts to permit the question of punitive damages to go to
the jury or to allow the full amount of the damage award to stand.2 °7
As the gatekeeper to which questions ultimately reach the jury, the
district court judges have an overwhelming amount of power in
crafting the relief an aggrieved party receives.0" If the courts are
reluctant to award exemplary relief-as the above examples suggest
may sometimes be the case-litigants may face a difficult battle in
obtaining punitive relief.
F. Conclusions of Analysis
Regardless of whether there were twenty-four Title VII cases
awarding punitive damages during 2004-2005,209 or whether there
were fifty-two Title VII punitive damage jury awards,210 the import
of these data remains the same. There are simply not a significant
number of Title VII punitive damage awards finding their way into
published district court decisions. Given the numerous Title VII
cases filed each year-indeed, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission alone filed 592 cases during fiscal years 2004-2005211
-the fact that so few cases resulted in a published award of
207. See generally Levi, supra note 13, at 600-01 ("[J]uries have regularly awarded
compensatory and punitive damages to victims of unlawful intentional discrimination under
Title VII. Many of these awards, however, have not gone uncontested in post-trial motions.!).
208. Cf. Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47
WM. & MARY L. REv. 911, 941 (2005) ("Judges who are skeptical about the prevalence of
discrimination in the workplace will continue to act as gatekeepers ....").
209. See supra Part IV.B.
210. See supra Part IV.D.2.
211. See EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 through FY 2006, http://www.eeoc.gov/
statsIlitigation.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2008) (during fiscal year 2004 the EEOC filed 297
Title VII claims and during fiscal year 2005 the EEOC filed 295 Title VII claims).
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punitive damages is quite telling. Although unexpected at first, the
results of this study are not necessarily surprising upon closer
analysis. In discussing exemplary relief outside of the employment
law context, one scholar observed that "every empirical study of the
question" of punitive damages "has reached conclusions that, to say
the least, fail to support [commonly held] beliefs" that such awards
"have grown dramatically in both frequency and size." '212 And, the
Supreme Court has recently noted that "[a] survey of the literature
reveals that discretion to award punitive damages has not mass-
produced runaway awards."21
As discussed in the previous section, it is possible that there were
punitive damage awards that did not result in a written opinion.214
It is equally possible that the parties settled cases that otherwise
would have resulted in significant punitive damage awards.21 Even
if this were the case, however, the lack of a significant number of
published decisions on punitive damages in employment cases is
just as troubling. It is exactly the publicly available court decision
of an employer being sanctioned with exemplary damages that is
likely to cause other employers to change their behavior.216 Public
punitive damage awards place all employers on notice that if they
discriminate, they can be severely sanctioned. Without these pub-
lished decisions, we cannot expect employer conduct to change.
The data also revealed that juries appear somewhat reluctant to
award punitive relief-less than 18 percent of Title VII cases that
reach a jury result in this type of award. 17 And in those cases where
a jury finds in favor of the plaintiff in a Title VII case, 29 percent of
those juries also award punitive relief.218 These numbers are in line
with at least one earlier analysis of punitive relief in employment
cases.219 The percentage of juries that award punitive damages to
212. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System -And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1254 (1992).
213. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2624 (2008).
214. See supra Part IV.C (discussing weaknesses in study).
215. See id.
216. Cf. Andrea A. Curcio, Breaking the Silence: Using a Notification Penalty and Other
Notification Measures in Punitive Damages Cases, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 343, 346 ("Publication
of wrongdoing achieves both the specific and general deterrent function of punitive dam-
ages.").
217. See supra Part IV.D (discussing results of JVR database search).
218. Id.
219. See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093,
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prevailing plaintiffs varies considerably depending upon the area of
the law--one study found that these rates ranged from 1.7 percent
in premises liability cases and 2.2 percent in product liability cases
to almost 30 percent in slander/libel cases.220
Though the results set forth in this Article for jury awards in
Title VII cases are at the higher end of this spectrum, a couple of
considerations should be addressed that are specific to employment
discrimination claims. First, unlike many other areas of the law, a
prevailing plaintiff in an employment discrimination case (outside
of the disparate impact context)221 will have already proven
intentional conduct on the part of the defendant. Employment
discrimination is, by its very nature, an intentional act.222 Thus,
because the defendant's conduct is intentional, punitive damages
should be particularly appropriate for many prevailing Title VII
plaintiffs. Second, punitive damage awards are capped and a
plaintiff cannot receive more than $300,000 of compensatory and
punitive relief combined. 2 3 Thus, the deterrent effect in punitive
damage cases have already been reduced by capping the award
potential. These factors combine to suggest punitive damages are
not having a significant deterrent effect in employment discrimina-
tion cases-in the event that a plaintiff actually prevails in the
case at trial and proves intentional discrimination, the victorious
plaintiff will have less than a one in three chance of also receiving
a (capped) punitive award.
1133-34 (1996) (noting that 26.8 percent of employment cases in which the plaintiff prevailed
resulted in an award of punitive damages in a study based on a sample of state court cases
in seventy-five counties ending in 1992).
220. See id. at 1133-34 (providing percentage rates in different areas of the law of those
punitive damage awards in cases where the plaintiffs prevailed in a sample of state court
cases ending in 1992); see also Catherine Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages,
113 YALE L.J. 347, 351 n.12 (2003) (discussing different studies on punitive damages and
providing percentages on the frequency of punitive awards).
221. SeeMICHAELJ. ZIMMER, CHARLESA. SuLLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASESAND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 322 at n.* (6th ed. 2003) (noting that "only a
small percentage of the total federal employment discrimination caseload involves disparate
impact claims" and that "only 101 of the 7613 employment civil rights cases brought in 1989
alleged disparate impact" (citing John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing
Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 989 (1991))).
222. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1) (2000) (providing for a civil action based on "intentional
discrimination").
223. Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
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Certainly, reasonable minds could differ on the effectiveness of
punitive damages in light of the results of my study, and drawing
conclusions from the data is in many ways a subjective process.
Nonetheless, given that the number of punitive awards in Title VII
published decisions was in the single digits in 2004,224 and given
that only about 29 percent of juries that ultimately find in favor of
the plaintiff also award punitive relief (which is still subject to court
review),225 it seems a fair conclusion that punitive damages are
simply not achieving their intended purpose. I leave the extent to
which punitive damages are missing their mark open to further
debate.
V. A CALL FOR CHANGE
The limited number of published employment discrimination
cases awarding punitive relief is surprising, and it should not go
unnoticed or uncorrected. I propose here one such alternative
approach to the punitive damage award scheme that currently
exists in Title VII. Specifically, I recommend that we adopt and
implement a model similar to the liquidated damages provision in
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)226 and Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA)227 as part of Title VII in place of the
current system. Liquidated damages can certainly "serve as a
necessary and beneficial deterrent" to employment discrimination.
2 28
While I believe that this sweeping reform would be a significant
improvement over the system of punitive relief currently in
existence, a liquidated damages framework for Title VII would need
to be carefully integrated into the statute so as to be equitably
applied to all parties and still serve a deterrent purpose. I discuss
the proposed approach in greater detail below.
224. See supra Part IV.B (discussing results of study).
225. See supra Part IV.D.2 (discussing JVR data).
226. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
227. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
228. Cf. Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1108 (3d Cir. 1995) (Garth,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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A. Liquidated Damages Proposal for Title VII
I recommend replacing the current system of punitive relief under
Title VII with an approach similar to the damages provisions under
the ADEA and FLSA, which currently provide for liquidated
damages.229 Under the liquidated damages scheme, an employer
could be liable for "double damages" of the actual damages suffered
by the plaintiff.23 ° A liquidated damages provision unquestionably
incorporates a "punitive dimension"23 1 to the statute, and would help
deter wrongful discriminatory conduct.23 2 I do not recommend
adopting the ADEA and FLSA damage provisions wholesale,
however, and set forth below the parameters of this proposal.
1. Actual Damages Doubled
Under my proposal, liquidated damages in the amount of double
the actual damages would replace punitive damages in Title VII.
Liquidated damages would be awarded automatically 2 3 upon a
finding of intentional discrimination by the judge or jury in a case
brought pursuant to Title VII. Actual damages would be defined as
any wage loss or other monetary harm suffered by the victim,
combined with any compensatory damages the plaintiff could
229. See, e.g., McGinty v. New York, 193 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1999) ("ADEA § 626(b),
incorporating the corresponding provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, mandates the
payment of liquidated damages in an amount equivalent to a plaintiff's award for back pay
and benefits where the statutory violation was 'willful.").
230. Cf. Diane G. Cluxton-Kremer, Comment, Redefining 'Willful" in the Liquidated
Damages Provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: The Tenth Circuit's
Approach, 68 DENY. U. L. REv. 485, 486 (1991) ("iTihe FLSA provides for an automatic
doubling of damages for a violation ..... ).
231. Michael D. Moberly, The Recoverability of Prejudgment Interest Under the ADEA
After Thurston, 8 LAB. LAW. 225, 239 (1992) ("Congress has indicated that there is a punitive
dimension to the FLSA award, just as there is to the ADEA award.").
232. Cf. Rebecca Marshall, Recent Development, Bootstrapping a Malice Requirement into
ADEA Liquidated Damage Awards, 62 WASH. L. REV. 551, 554 (1987) ("Congress enacted the
ADEA hybrid damages and eliminated criminal penalties in order to preserve a punitive and
deterrent effect and avoid the proof problems of a criminal penalty.").
233. See generally Powers v. Grinnell Corp., 915 F.2d 34, 35 n.1 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Victims
of willful ADEA violations therefore are automatically entitled to liquidated damages equal
to their back pay award.").
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demonstrate. Because they are speculative in nature, front pay
losses would not be subject to the liquidated damages formula.234
This approach would be similar to the damages provisions of the
ADEA and FLSA. Liquidated damages are available to plaintiffs
who demonstrate a violation of the FLSA or a "willful" violation of
the ADEA235 for "an amount equal to the amount deemed to be
unpaid [wages or compensation],"23 though compensatory damages
are generally unavailable under these statutes,2 37 with certain
exceptions.2 38 Thus, under my proposed approach, if a plaintiff were
234. See Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1210 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding
that front pay was not subject to the liquidated damages provision of the ADEA because "front
pay is a prospective remedy); Mitchell v. Sisters of Charity of Incarnate Word, 924 F. Supp.
793, 802 (S.D. Tex. 1996) ('The liquidated damages provision of the ADEA does not require
the doubling of the front pay award.").
235. The damages provisions of the ADEA and FLSA operate differently. As the Supreme
Court has noted, "§ 16(b) of the FLSA, which makes the award of liquidated damages
mandatory, is significantly qualified in ADEA § 7(b) by a proviso that a prevailing plaintiff
is entitled to double damages 'only in cases of willful violations."' Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985) (emphasis added); see also Jennifer Baugh, Note,
Punitive Damages and the Anti-Retaliation Penalties Provision of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1717, 1740-41 (2004) (discussing the difference between the liquidated
damages provisions of the FLSA and the ADEA).
236. See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 524 (2d ed. 1983) (citing § 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000), incorporated by
reference into the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)); Evan Hudson-Plush, Note, WARN's Place in the
FLSA/Employment Discrimination Dichotomy: Why a Warning Cannot Be Waived, 27
CARDozO L. REV. 2929, 2946 n. 115 (2006) (noting that the FLSA provides that "an employer
liable for a violation of FLSA shall pay liquidated damages equal to the amount of unpaid
minimum wages").
237. See Michael D. Moberly, Evolution in the Civil Rights Revolution: The Survival of
Employment Discrimination Claims for Pain and Suffering, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1,
10 (1999) ("Neither compensatory nor punitive damages are recoverable under the FLSA .....);
Carolyn F. Kolks, Note, United States v. Burke - Does it Definitively Resolve the Analytical
Confusion Created by the Section 104(a)(2) Personal Injury Exclusion?, 46 ARK. L. REv. 657,
686 (1993) (noting that "[g]eneral compensatory and punitive damages are not available
under" the ADEA). For purposes of this Article, compensatory damages are defined as
compensation for pain and suffering experienced by the plaintiff. See generally Tacker v.
Monsanto Co., No. 4:06-CV-1815, 2007 WL 1686957, at *3 (E.D. Mo. June 8, 2007) ("Ihe
Court concludes that emotional distress damages are not available under the FLSA.').
238. There is some controversy in the courts as to whether compensatory and punitive
damages are available for FLSA retaliation claims, though "[n]o circuit court has held that
punitive damages are available in non-retaliatory discharge cases." Philip L. Bartlett II,
Disparate Treatment: How Income Can Affect the Level of Employer Compliance with
Employment Statutes, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLy' 419, 476 (2002); see Baugh, supra note
235, at 1728-29 (discussing FLSA damages). A similar question exists as to the damages
available in ADEA retaliation cases. See Tomao v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 04 C 3470, 2007 WL
2225905, at **17-20 (N.D. IlM. July 31, 2007) ("[Ihe Seventh Circuit appears to have
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able to prove at trial in a Title VII action that he lost $5000 in
wages and suffered $20,000 in compensatory damages as a result of
his employer's intentional discrimination, he would also be entitled
to an additional $25,000 of liquidated damages. 239 This liquidated
damages approach would be far more equitable than the system
currently in place under Title VII. Liquidated damages would be
directly correlated, on a one-to-one basis, with the actual harm
suffered by the victim. Under the current system, there is no such
correlation, and employers are sometimes subject to large punitive
damage awards where there is no substantive underlying injury.
Indeed, in some cases courts have permitted punitive damage
awards where there was no compensatory damage award or other
monetary loss at all.240 For example, in Timm v. Progressive Steel
Treating, Inc.,241 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an
award of $15,000 in punitive damages with no other award of
damages in the case.242 The Second Circuit took the same approach
in Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp.,243 awarding $100,000 in pu-
nitive relief where there were no other monetary damages estab-
lished.244
Other cases have permitted large ratios between the compensa-
tory damages incurred and the actual harm suffered. For example,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals approved a punitive damage
award ten times that of the compensatory award in Rubinstein v.
Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund.245 Similarly, in Tisdale
expressed its belief that by amending the FLSA-the ADEA's remedial template-to
authorize 'legal' relief 'without limitation,' Congress sufficiently broadened § 216(b) to support
an award of compensatory and punitive damages for retaliation under both the FLSA and the
ADEA.").
239. See, e.g., Powell v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 788 F.2d 279, 282, 287-88 (5th Cir. 1986)
(upholding a district court's award doubling back pay as liquidated damages in a case brought
pursuant to the ADEA).
240. See Levi, supra note 13, at 583 ("One issue that currently divides courts is whether
a jury can award punitive damages to a Title VII plaintiff after it concludes that the plaintiff
is not entitled to any compensatory damages under [the statute].").
241. 137 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 1998).
242. Id. at 1010 ('Punitive damages (as awarded here) are applicable even in the absence
of actual damages ....'. (quoting Erwin v. County of Manitowoc, 872 F.2d 1292, 1299 (7th Cir.
1989))).
243. 271 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2001).
244. Id. at 356-57 ("An award of actual or nominal damages is not a prerequisite for an
award of punitive damages in Title VII cases.").
245. 218 F.3d 392, 407-09 (6th Cir. 2004) (approving a $25,000 punitive damage award in
778 [Vol. 50:735
2008] A CALL FOR CHANGE 779
v. Federal Express Corp.,246 the Sixth Circuit approved a $100,000
punitive damage award in a case in which a jury had awarded only
$15,000 in other monetary damages.247
Thus, in many respects, employers would benefit under my
proposal as they would never be subjected to punitive awards or
liquidated damages in amounts greater than the amount of actual
damages suffered by the plaintiff, as they currently are under the
Title VII remedial scheme.24 Unlike the current system, the
proposed approach would require a direct relationship between the
actual harm suffered and the additional damages awarded. Similar
to the damages provisions under the ADEA249 and FLSA,250 liqui-
dated damages under Title VII would "deter intentional violations
... therefore making an award of liquidated damages punitive in
nature."25' Integrating liquidated damages into Title VII would thus
serve the deterrent purpose Congress intended when it originally
passed the 1991 CRA.
2 52
a case in which only $2500 in compensatory damages had been awarded).
246. 415 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2005).
247. Id. at 525, 535 ("In this case, the punitive damages award is $100,000, less than seven
times the backpay award and one-third of the maximum which Congress determined to be
reasonable for a company of FedEx's size. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did
not err in refusing to set aside the punitive damages award.").
248. See supra notes 240-47 and accompanying text.
249. See Judith J. Johnson, A Uniform Standard for Exemplary Damages in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 41, 42-43 (1999) (arguing that the standard for
determining whether exemplary relief is available under Title VII should "be the same as that
approved by the Supreme Court for liquidated damages, which are the equivalent of punitive
damages, under the ADEA").
250. Compare Lavinia A. James, Comment, Damages in Age Discrimination Cases-The
Need for a Closer Look, 17 U. RICH. L. REv. 573, 585 (1983) ("An award of liquidated damages
under the FLSA is generally not considered to be punitive in nature. However, the ADEA, by
conditioning liquidated damages on a willful violation, has focused the availability of such an
award on the nature of the defendant's act." (footnote omitted)), with Moberly, supra note 231,
at 239 (discussing the punitive nature of FLSA awards).
251. Trisha A. Thelen, Note, Liquidated Damages and Statutes of Limitations Under the
"Willful" Standard of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: Repercussions of Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 24 WASHBURN L.J.
516, 521 (1985); see Moberly, supra note 231, at 239 ("By creating a pattern of recovery in
which the award of liquidated damages is now mandatory only where the employer has not
acted in good faith, Congress has indicated that there is a punitive dimension to the FLSA
award, just as there is to the ADEA award." (footnote omitted)).
252. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.2, at 1 (1991); supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
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2. Abandon the Malice or Reckless Indifference Standard
Pursuant to the current system of Title VII relief, an employee
can establish a claim for punitive damages if that individual can
show that the defendant "engaged in a discriminatory practice ...
with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected
rights of an aggrieved individual.""2 3 Under my proposal, this
standard would become irrelevant and would be replaced with a
simple showing of intentional discrimination to establish a claim for
liquidated damages. Indeed, perhaps the greatest benefit of this
proposal would be the abandonment of the malice-or-reckless-
indifference standard. This standard is "fraught with ambiguity"
254
and has generated significant confusion among litigants and in the
courts."' The liquidated damages provision, which would replace
the maliciousness standard with the far simpler question of intent,
would thus be significantly easier for the courts and juries to
apply.256 In fact, the jury is already required to resolve the intent
inquiry in answering the initial question of liability in the case.25 7
Therefore, under my proposed approach, in all successful claims
of disparate treatment (or "intentional") discrimination, the plaintiff
would presumptively be entitled to liquidated damages equal to the
253. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2000).
254. See Jason P. Pogorelec, Note, Under What Circumstances Did Congress Intend to
Award Punitive Damages for Victims of Unlawful Intentional Discrimination Under Title VII,
40 B.C. L. REV. 1269, 1297 (1999) ("The language of [the statute] is ambiguous and provides
little help in determining the circumstances under which Congress intended Title VII punitive
damages to be awarded. Because [the statute] uses the terms 'malice' and 'reckless
indifference,' which are fraught with ambiguity, it is difficult to ascertain Congress's intent
in awarding Title VII punitive damages from the statute's plain language." (footnote
omitted)).
255. See generally E.E.O.C. v. Stocks, Inc., No. 06-10871, 2007 WL 1119186, at **1-3 (5th
Cir. Apr. 16, 2007) (reversing district court's refusal to give issue of punitive damages to jury
and finding that there was sufficient evidence of malice or reckless indifference to present
question of exemplary relief to trier of fact); McDonough v. City of Quincy, 452 F.3d 8, 23-24
(1st Cir. 2006) (same).
256. Cf. Johnson, supra note 249, at 99 ("The Supreme Court's interpretation of 'reckless
indifference' under the ADEA was to allow the defendant to avoid punitive damages by
showing that its violation of the law was in good faith based on reasonable belief. This is the
only interpretation of the 1991 Civil Rights Act that makes sense.").
257. See, e.g., Janine M. Weaver, Note, Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Landgrafv. USI Film
Prods., 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1061, 1064 (1995) ("[I]f the complaining party seeks
compensatory or punitive damages, the party may demand a jury trial under the 1991 Act.").
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amount of actual damages suffered. This approach is equitable in
nature as the plaintiff must still demonstrate that the defendant
engaged in intentional discrimination to obtain the additional relief,
and an employer should be discouraged from intentionally engaging
in this illegal conduct. And, as discussed in greater detail below,
where employers can demonstrate that they have attempted to
comply with the statute they will still have the opportunity to avoid
liability.258
3. Eliminate the Statutory Cap for Liquidated Damages
Under the current system of punitive damages in Title VII, the
award of exemplary relief is capped at varying amounts depending
upon the size of the employer.25 9 For the largest employers, a
successful plaintiff can obtain up to the statutory cap of $300,000
for punitive damages and compensatory damages combined."
The statutory caps were seen as a compromise whereby Congress
acknowledged that punitive damages were a necessary part of the
statute, but that such relief would be limited.261 Under my liqui-
dated damages proposal, however, the statutory caps would no
longer be necessary, although the caps could remain in place for any
award of compensatory damages.262
Initially, it should be noted that one potential limitation on the
deterrent effect of punitive relief is that the statutory caps on
exemplary awards have remained unchanged for over fifteen
years.2"3 Given the negative effects of inflation on these awards,
their deterrent effect has decreased significantly over time.2 Thus,
258. See infra Part VA.4 (discussing how the good faith defense would be applied to my
liquidated damages proposal).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000); see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
260. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3); see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 85, at 408 (discussing the compromise behind statutory
caps in the Civil Rights Act).
262. I would recommend, however, that the compensatory damage caps be increased each
year by an index tied to inflation.
263. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 1977A(b)(3)(O), 105 Stat. 1071,
1073.
264. Cf. Michael W. Roskiewicz, Note, Title VII Remedies: Lifting the Statutory Caps from
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Achieve Equal Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 43
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 391, 413-14 (1993) (stating that predictable caps reduce
deterrent effects); Ruggles, supra note 8, at 155 (same).
20081
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it would take an award of $468,466.14 in 2008 to have the same
financial impact as an award of $300,000 in 1992.265 Yet the caps
have remained the same.
Irrespective of the inflationary effects of time, the statutory caps
would serve little purpose under a liquidated damages scheme. This
is because the liquidated damages would be tied in a one-to-one
ratio to the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff.2 16 Under this
system, the amount of liquidated damages is already capped by the
amount of harm demonstrated by the plaintiff. Thus, under this
proposed system, defendants would not be subjected to the possibil-
ity of punitive awards in amounts far in excess of the actual harm
suffered, as they are under the current system.267 And, in those
cases where the defendant has intentionally injured the plaintiff
and the combined compensatory damage and liquidated damage
awards are above $300,000, the defendant would still have the
opportunity to avoid the liquidated damages portion of this award
by demonstrating good faith, as discussed further below.268 If the
defendant has discriminated and cannot show good faith, that
defendant has intentionally violated the statute with unclean
hands, and the equities would lean in favor of such an award, even
if it were to exceed the caps currently set by the 1991 CRA.269 In
addition, the liquidated damages provision in the ADEA and FLSA
contain no statutory caps. ° Indeed, the statutory caps present in
265. See Inflation Calculator: Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://databls.gov/cgi-bin/
cpicalc.pl (last visited Nov. 25, 2008). See generally Roskiewicz, supra note 264, at 418 ("Only
by eliminating the caps on compensatory and punitive damages available to Title VII
discrimination victims can Congress accomplish its initial goal of absolute equality.");
Ruggles, supra note 8, at 164 ("The current statutory caps on punitive damages in intentional
employment discrimination do not allow for effective enforcement of anti-discrimination
laws.").
266. See supra Part V.A.1 (discussing my liquidated damages proposal as a doubling of the
actual harm suffered by a plaintiff).
267. See Part V.A.1 (discussing cases in which punitive awards far exceeded the actual
damages a plaintiff demonstrates).
268. See infra Part V.A.4 (discussing how the good faith defense would be applied to my
liquidated damages proposal).
269. See Judith J. Johnson, A Standard for Punitive Damages Under Title VII, 46 FLA. L.
REv. 521, 524 (1994) ("[Plunitive damages should be presumptively appropriate in all cases
in which the defendant has intentionally discriminated. To avoid the imposition of punitive
damages, the defendant should bear the burden of persuasion to show that she acted
reasonably and in good faith.").
270. See Michelle Cucuzza, Evaluating Emotional Distress Damage Awards to Promote
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Title VII are relatively unique to federal employment law claims.2"1
In this regard, the liquidated damages proposal would also bring
Title VII more in line with the damages provisions of other employ-
ment laws.272
4. Good Faith Defense
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,273 the Supreme Court
stated that an employer that violates the ADEA is not subject to
liquidated damages "if the employer acted reasonably and in ...
'good faith."'274 Similarly, in Kolstad, the Supreme Court provided
that an employer otherwise subject to punitive damages for a
violation of Title VII can avoid liability by demonstrating that it has
engaged in "good faith efforts at Title VII compliance." '275 Good faith
can be established if the employer has effectively maintained and
implemented a policy or program attempting to prevent discrimina-
tion.276 By creating this good faith defense to Title VII, the Supreme
Court attempted to "promote [the] prevention as well as reme-
diation" of discriminatory practices.277
Good faith defenses can be found throughout employment law.
The Supreme Court has carved out an exception to supervisor
liability in cases of sexual harassment where "the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior" and the victim "unreasonably failed to
Settlement of Employment Discrimination Claims in the Second Circuit, 65 BROOK. L. REV.
393, 410-11 (1999) ("[here is no cap with respect to damages awarded under the ADEA,
§§ 1981 and 1983 ...." (footnotes omitted)). See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2006) (statutory
text of FLSA).
271. See Cucuzza, supra note 270, at 410-11. The Americans with Disabilities Act, however,
also contains the same statutory caps as Title VII. Id. at 410 ("The 1991 Civil Rights Act
limits a plaintiffs recovery of emotional distress damages rendered pursuant to Title VII and
the ADA.").
272. Recent legislation has been introduced in the U.S. Senate that "would remove the
compensatory and punitive damage caps for violations of the anti-discrimination laws under
Title VII." Stephen Allred, Commentary: Congress Acts to Overturn Supreme Court's Wage
Discrimination Decision in Ledbetter, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 20, 2007. There is certainly a
substantial question, however, whether this legislation will become law.
273. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
274. Id. at 128 n.22.
275. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 544 (1999).
276. Id. at 544-45.
277. Id. at 545-46.
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take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities.""v
Similarly, under the FLSA, an employer may be able to avoid
liquidated damages where that employer "acted in subjective 'good
faith' and had objectively 'reasonable grounds' for believing that the
acts or omissions" did not violate the statute.279
In allowing the good faith defense, Congress and the courts
integrate a compromise into the statutory schemes of employment
discrimination law that balances the interests of full recovery for
the plaintiff and deterrence of discriminatory conduct with the
interests of fairness and equity for defendants.8 ° In essence, an
employer should be punished and deterred from repeating illegal
acts; but that same employer should not suffer the full sanctions
of the law where it has acted with clean hands and in good faith.28'
In Kolstad, the Supreme Court struck a careful and well-reasoned
compromise in allowing the good faith defense for punitive dam-
ages.28 2 A similar affirmative good faith defense to my liquidated
damages proposal would also "promote prevention as well as
remediation" in Title VII.28 a I would therefore recommend that the
good faith defense that currently exists as to punitive damages be
similarly applied to any liquidated damages provision implemented
in Title VII. For the most part, this defense has been treated as an
affirmative one-the employer bears the burden of proof of demon-
strating its good faith. 2' Thus, when an employer is found liable for
intentional discrimination under Title VII, that employer would be
permitted to escape liability for liquidated damages under my
278. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). This defense applies in
hostile work environment cases where there is no tangible employment action. Id.
279. Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1999).
280. See, e.g., Susan Grover, After Ellerth: The Tangible Employment Action in Sexual
Harassment Analysis, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 809, 819 n.57 (2002) (describing the
compromise resulting from the Supreme Court's decisions in Faragher and Ellerth).
281. See id. (noting that "the Court perceived its prescribed analytic framework as a
compromise between the principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of
supervisory authority and Title VII's ... policies of encouraging forethought by employers and
saving action by objecting employees"' (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998))).
282. See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544-46.
283. Id. at 545.
284. See McInnis v. Fairfield Cmtys., Inc., 458 F.3d 1129, 1137 n.3 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting
that the court had not decided where the burden of proof lies on the punitive damages good
faith defense, but that "[a] number of other courts have determined that the defense is an
affirmative one and place the burden to establish it on the defendant").
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proposal by affirmatively proving that it acted in good faith." 5 This
could be done primarily by showing that the employer has effec-
tively maintained and implemented a policy or program attempting
to prevent discrimination.286
An employer should also "make a good faith effort to educate its
employees about [its antidiscrimination] policies and the statutory
prohibitions. 287 In essence, the employer must show that it "made
every effort reasonably possible to detect and deter discrimination,"
which would include training and education on antidiscrimination
policies, as well as "monitoring and supervision efforts. 288 It is also
worth noting that whether an employer has acted with sufficient
good faith to evade liquidated damages after a finding of intentional
discrimination would inherently be a question of fact for the jury
alone.289 The jury's key determination would be deciding whether
the employer's efforts were "truly preventive," and not "merely
symbolic., 29" The defense might be appropriate, for example, where
a supervisor intentionally discriminated against a subordinate
(while acting within the scope of employment), but the company had
no knowledge of the discriminatory acts, maintained an effective
policy prohibiting discrimination, and provided training on Title VII
to its employees.29'
Though a compromise to be sure, the good faith defense does
promote preventive measures that help discourage discrimination
in the workplace from occurring in the first instance.292 The good
285. Cf. Johnson, supra note 249, at 49 (recommending that the good faith exception apply
to Title VII punitive damages claims, and that this exception be applied in a similar fashion
to the liquidated damage claims under ADEA).
286. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544-45.
287. Mclnnis, 458 F.3d at 1138 (quoting Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 224 F.3d 1203, 1210
(10th Cir. 2000)).
288. Timothy J. Moran, Punitive Damages in Fair Housing Litigation: Ending Unwise
Restrictions on a Necessary Remedy, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 340 (2001).
289. See, e.g., id. at 340 ("Kolstad did not address whether courts or juries should decide
when the good faith defense has been proved. Thus far, the courts of appeal have treated the
issue as a jury question. This approach is proper." (footnote omitted)).
290. Id. at 338.
291. See generally Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544-46.
292. See, e.g., Richard S. Gruner, Developing Judicial Standards for Evaluating
Compliance Programs: Insights from EEOLitigations, in PRACTISINGLAWINSTM EADVANCE
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WORKSHOP 2002, at 161 (2002) ("Kolstad opens up the opportunity
for employers to minimize a broad range of punitive damages by operating systematic
programs for preventing illegal employment discrimination.").
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faith defense would therefore help achieve the goal of deterring
illegal discriminatory conduct 293 which Congress attempted to
integrate into Title VII through the 1991 CRA. 294 Allowing the
defense would also help streamline antidiscrimination law by
conforming the liquidated damages provision with other areas of
employment law that have taken the employer's good faith into
consideration when awarding damages. 295 The good faith defense is
therefore a critical component of my liquidated damages proposal.
B. Liquidated Damages Proposal Summary
In sum, I propose replacing the current scheme of punitive
damages set forth in the 1991 CRA with a three-part test that would
provide liquidated damages in many cases of discrimination and
would serve as a more effective form of preventing illegal conduct in
the workplace. The rationale for this test was outlined in detail
above296 and would apply in all cases alleging intentional employ-
ment discrimination pursuant to Title VII.297
Under this three-part test, the trier of fact would initially
determine whether the plaintiff carried its burden of persuasion of
establishing intentional discrimination.29 This analysis would
proceed in the same manner as it has for many years under Title
293. See, e.g., id. at 165 ("By actively informing managers and employees about the
requirements of federal anti-discrimination laws, monitoring efforts to comply with those
laws, and reacting with discipline and reforms when illegal activities are found, employers
can qualify for the good faith defense ....").
294. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.2, at 1 (1991); supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
295. See supra Part V.A.4 (discussing other employment laws that contain good a faith
component when assessing damages).
296. See supra Part V.A (discussing the purpose of replacing the current system of
exemplary relief under Title VII with liquidated damages).
297. Liquidated damages would not be available in those cases alleging disparate impact
(or unintentional) discrimination. A damages provision targeted at punishing or deterring
employers would be inconsistent with cases where intent is not established. See generally
David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 8 LAB. LAW. 849, 856
(1992) (noting that the punitive and compensatory "damages may be recovered only in cases
of intentional discrimination; they are not available in 'disparate impact' cases").
298. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) ("Although
intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this framework, '[t]he ultimate
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981))).
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VII and the case law interpreting this statute. Thus, nothing in
my proposal would alter the classic McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green299 test for demonstrating intentional discrimination,0 0 or
those subsequent cases that have provided additional guidance on
how plaintiffs should go about establishing intentional discrimina-
tion.3°' If the plaintiff fails to carry its burden, the case is over, and
no further inquiry is needed.30 2 If intentional discrimination is
found, however, the district court and trier of fact would be required
to determine the appropriate amount of relief to award the plaintiff.
This amount would include all relief currently available to Title VII
litigants, including compensatory damages,30 3 back pay, and front
pay.30 4 These damages would be awarded in the same way that they
have always been awarded under Title VII, the 1991 CRA, and the
interpreting case law.30 ' The only distinction between the current
analysis and my proposal would be that the question of punitive
damages would not be submitted to the trier of fact.3 6 At the final
299. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
300. Pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff can demonstrate a prima
facie case of discrimination by showing that he is a member of a protected class, suffered an
adverse employment action, was qualified for the job, and was replaced by an individual
outside of the protected group. Id. at 802; see also Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476
F.3d 337, 345 (5th Cir. 2007). The defendant then has a burden of production of demon-
strating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 802-03; see also Turner, 476 F.3d at 345. The plaintiff must then show that the defendant's
reason is a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803; see also Turner,
476 F.3d at 345.
301. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92, 98-101 (2003); Reeves, 530 U.S.
at 143; St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 504, 511, 525 (1993).
302. This proposal does not suggest a bifurcated trial whereby the trier of fact would first
determine liability and then proceed to the damages question in a separate proceeding. See,
e.g., Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1348 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that "district
court bifurcated the jury trial for liability and damages purposes" in a Title VII matter).
Instead, the jury would be instructed that it need not answer additional questions concerning
damages or good faith if its finding is that no intentional discrimination is present.
303. To the extent that the jury's compensatory damage award exceeded the statutory caps,
the amount would be reduced to comply with the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000). If
liquidated damages were appropriate in the case, only the reduced compensatory award would
be doubled under my proposal.
304. See id. § 1981a; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000) (setting forth the various damages
provisions of Title VII); supra note 85 and accompanying text.
305. See generally Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and EEOC
Enforcement, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 1993, at 143, 146-50 (Practicing
Law Institute 1993) (discussing the damages provisions of Title VII).
306. See supra Part V.A (discussing the rationale behind abandoning punitive damage
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stage of the analysis, the employer would have the opportunity to
demonstrate its good faith to the trier of fact.a°7 The employer would
be free to present all relevant evidence in this regard. °8 In the
majority of cases, however, the employer would establish good faith
by demonstrating that it has effectively implemented and enforced
a policy or program attempting to prevent discrimination.0 9 If the
defendant successfully carries its burden on this question, it will
escape liability for liquidated damages,310 but it will still be subject
to the other relief awarded. If the defendant is unsuccessful in
demonstrating that it acted in good faith, the district court must
also award liquidated damages to the plaintiff in an amount equal
to the actual relief of back pay and compensatory damages already
awarded.
As enumerated below, the three-part test for determining
liquidated damages in Title VII claims of intentional discrimination
would proceed as follows:
1. The plaintiff would have the burden of persuasion of
demonstrating intentional discrimination to the trier of
fact.
2. If intentional discrimination is proven, the trier of fact
and district court judge would determine the appropriate
amount of relief under the statute. The question of
punitive damages would not be at issue.
3. The defendant would have an opportunity to establish an
affirmative good faith defense to the trier of fact. If the
defense is successful, no liquidated damages would be
awarded. If the defense is unsuccessful, the district court
would award liquidated damages in the amount equal to
actual damages in the case.
Thus, cases brought under my proposal would largely proceed as
they currently do under Title VII. The significant distinction,
awards in Title VII cases).
307. See supra Part V.A.4 (discussing the incorporation of a good faith defense into my
liquidated damages proposal).
308. See generally Lopez v. Aramark Unif. & Career Apparel, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 914, 963
(N.D. Iowa 2006) (noting that the Kolstad Court "did not define the contours of what measures
constitute 'good faith efforts").
309. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 544-45 (1999).
310. See id. at 544 (permitting employers to avoid liability for exemplary damages in Title
VII cases by acting in good faith).
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however, would be that liquidated damages would take the place of
exemplary relief.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROPOSAL
The liquidated damages proposal set forth in this Article would
have a number of significant advantages over the current system of
punitive damages that exists in cases of employment discrimination.
As discussed throughout the Article, the primary purpose behind
the addition of punitive damages to Title VII was Congress's hope
that such exemplary relief would deter unlawful employment
discrimination. 11 The addition of liquidated damages to Title VII
would help to better effectuate the deterrent effect that Congress
originally intended when it added punitive relief to the statute. By
punishing all acts of intentional discrimination where the employer
was not acting in good faith, liquidated relief would strongly
discourage an employer from illegally discriminating against its
workforce. Liquidated damages would therefore not only serve the
original intent of Congress,31 but would also accomplish one of the
primary goals of punitive damages in the judicial system--deter-
rence.313 Moreover, the proposed framework would be far easier and
more routine for courts to apply than the current system of punitive
relief. Since the 1991 CRA was passed, "courts have struggled to
determine the appropriate circumstances to award Title VII
punitive damages. '31 4 The standard for awarding exemplary relief
in employment cases is simply too ambiguous and creates far too
much uncertainty in the process.315 As demonstrated earlier, the
311. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.2, at 1 (1991). See generally Johnson, supra note 269, at 561
("mhe only viable solution is to construct an articulable standard for awarding punitive
damages which is based on the reasons for the award: deterrence and punishment.").
312. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.2, at 1.
313. See supra Part I (discussing the role and purpose of punitive relief in the legal
system); cf. Johnson, supra note 269, at 530 ('The liquidated damages provision in the ADEA
is similar in purpose to the punitive damages provision in Title VII; both are designed to
punish an employer who has discriminated.").
314. Pogorelec, supra note 254, at 1306.
315. See id. at 1297 ("The language of [the statute] is ambiguous and provides little help
in determining the circumstances under which Congress intended Title VII punitive damages
to be awarded. Because [the statute] uses the terms 'malice' and 'reckless indifference,' which
are fraught with ambiguity, it is difficult to ascertain Congress's intent in awarding Title VII
punitive damages from the statute's plain language." (footnote omitted)).
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current framework of punitive relief has created significant
inconsistencies in the courts.316 The proposed structure of importing
liquidated damages into Title VII would therefore significantly
streamline what is currently an overly cumbersome process of
awarding exemplary relief.
In addition, the proposed approach would increase predictability
in the amount of damages awarded in employment discrimination
cases. 17 Because liquidated damages simply double damages for the
amount of actual harm incurred, determining potential liability
would be far easier for the parties under my proposal than under
the current system, where the court and jury have significant
discretion in fashioning punitive relief.318 A greater amount of
certainty in the legal system increases the likelihood of settlement
between parties and 'leads to reduced litigation costs." '319 Greater
certainty and increased settlements would inherently save judicial
resources through the reduced number of lawsuits clogging up the
court system. 2 ° The proposed approach would also bring the system
of relief more in line with claims of age discrimination brought
pursuant to the ADEA and wage and hour claims brought pursuant
to the FLSA. 21 The ADEA and FLSA currently utilize liquidated
damages frameworks similar to the one proposed here for Title
316. See supra Part M.E (discussing recent appellate employment discrimination decisions
in which district courts' failures to give punitive damage instructions were overturned).
317. Cf. Johnson, supra note 269, at 524 (arguing that using same standard for Title VII
punitive damages and ADEA liquidated damages would 'lead to more uniform results");
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2625 (2008) ('The real problem it seems, is the
stark unpredictability of punitive awards.").
318. Cf. Powers v. Grinnell Corp., 915 F.2d 34,35 n.1 (1st Cir. 1990) (addressing liquidated
damages awards for ADEA willful violations and noting that such awards are applied
"automatically').
319. Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment: Adapting
the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POLY' REv. 95, 136 (2006) (citing Richard B. Stewart,
The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis.
L. REV. 655, 662 ("The more certain the law-the less the variance in expected outcomes-the
more likely the parties will predict the same outcome from litigation, and the less likely that
litigation will occur because of differences in predicted outcomes.")).
320. See generally id. (discussing the benefits of greater certainty in the legal system).
321. See Johnson, supra note 249, at 42 (recommending that the standard for liquidated
damages in the ADEA be applied to punitive damage claims in Title VII).
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VII.322 And, as in the ADEA and FLSA, there would be no statutory
cap on damages under the proposed approach for Title VII. 32 3
There would indeed be some key differences between the damage
provisions of the statutes-most notably the availability of compen-
satory damages in Title VII, which are generally unavailable under
the FLSA and ADEA.324 Nonetheless, the addition of liquidated
damages to Title VII would go a long way toward making the
statutes parallel. Indeed, in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Congress expressed a clear intent to bring more conformity to
statutes protecting employment discrimination, and this proposal
would clearly serve Congress's intent in that regard.325 And, given
that age discrimination claims yield far more significant monetary
awards than cases involving race, sex, or disability discrimination,
bringing Title VII more in line with the ADEA could further
enhance the deterrent effect of the statute.326 Finally, perhaps the
greatest benefit of the proposed approach is that it is equitable to
322. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 236, at 524 (discussing the application of
liquidated damages to age discrimination claims and citing § 16(b) of the FLSA, 29
U.S.C. § 216(b), incorporated by reference in the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)).
323. See supra Part V.A.3 (discussing the lack of statutory caps on damages in FLSA and
ADEA employment claims).
324. See supra Part V.A. 1 (discussing the absence of compensatory damages in FLSA and
ADEA employment claims).
325. Julie M. Spanbauer, Kimel and Garrett: Another Example of the Court Undervaluing
Individual Sovereignty and Settled Expectations, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 787, 788 n.15 (2003)
("[W]hen damage remedies were made available via the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress
explicitly declared: 'Strengthening Title VII's remedial scheme to provide monetary damages
for intentional gender and religious discrimination is necessary to conform remedies ......
(quoting Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of Social
Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 273, 336 (2001))).
326. See JURY VERDIcT RESEARCH, EMPLOYMENT PRACICE LIABmTY: JURYAWARD TRENDS
AND STATISTICS 14 (Lisa Nolf ed., 2006) (setting forth the mean and median awards for
various claims of discrimination). During the years 1999-2005, age discrimination claims
yielded a median award of $255,979 and a mean award of $1,179,739. Other areas of
employment discrimination law had significantly lower means and medians. See id. (noting
a mean award of $225,000 and a median award of $633,975 in disability cases, a median
award of $170,000 and mean award of $528,819 in race discrimination cases, and a median
award of $186,250 and mean award of $614,917 in sex discrimination cases). There may be
several factors that would explain this disparity, however, and I acknowledge that further
research on the effectiveness of the relief granted under the ADEA and the FLSA would be
beneficial. Additionally, it is worth emphasizing that the approach proposed by this Article
is different from the damages provisions of the FLSA and ADEA, though the proposed
approach would bring the Title VII damages provisions more in line with the other statutes.
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both defendants and plaintiffs. The approach is fair in its applica-
tion-liquidated damages would be awarded on an equal basis with
the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff. This would advantage
employers as they would no longer be subjected to large punitive
awards many multiples the amount of the actual harm suffered.
2 7
At the same time, plaintiffs would have greater access to liquidated
damages than to punitive relief, as such awards would be applicable
in all cases of intentional discrimination in which the defendant is
unable to show that it acted in good faith. As demonstrated earlier,
the data suggests that under the current approach, in those cases
where a jury finds in favor of the plaintiff in a Title VII case, less
than one-third of juries also award punitive relief. 8'
Some might argue that the proposed approach is skewed toward
the benefit of plaintiffs, as the statutory caps of Title VII would be
completely lifted under the revised framework. This could poten-
tially leave defendants exposed to unlimited liability. While caps do
bring a certain amount of comfort to employers by fixing a ceiling on
their potential liability, the proposed approach would implement
safeguards to make certain that employers were not unfairly
subjected to heightened awards. As already discussed, the liqui-
dated damages proposal would subject employers only to double
damages-a ratio far below their current potential liability.2 9
Moreover, employers would still be able to demonstrate that they
acted in good faith to evade liability for liquidated damages.3 °
And in those cases where the defendant has intentionally violated
the statute, and done so with unclean hands, the equities would
certainly favor compensating the plaintiff with full monetary relief
as well as double damages.3 3 ' An employer intentionally discrimi-
nating against its employees in bad faith should be unable to hide
327. See supra Part V.A.1 (discussing appellate decisions that approved punitive awards
in amounts multiple times the plaintiff's harm).
328. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the results of the JVR database search).
329. See supra Part VA.1 (discussing cases in which courts approved punitive damages
highly in excess of actual damages).
330. See supra Part V.A.4 (discussing the application of the good faith exception to my
liquidated damages proposal).
331. Cf. Johnson, supra note 249, at 99 ("Because no employer today can or should be able
to profess ignorance of the law that discrimination is illegal, the absence of a good faith
reasonable belief is the only logical meaning of 'reckless indifference' to statutory rights.").
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behind the protections of an artificially constructed statutory ceiling
which has remained a fixed dollar amount for over fifteen years.
Additionally, one may argue that the current system of punitive
damages in Title VII is a more effective deterrent to unlawful
employment discrimination than the proposed model. In this regard,
the few reported decisions on punitive damages in Title VII claims
might be explained by many cases settling because of the mere
threat of punitive relief. This is certainly a possibility, though the
effect of settlements on the punitive data is difficult to measure.
Moreover, this argument would not completely explain why only
about 18 percent of juries award exemplary damages and why less
than one-third of prevailing plaintiffs receive punitive relief."2 If
punitive damages were a form of relief truly feared by employers,
courts would likely see higher percentages of juries awarding this
form of relief. And, regardless of the ultimate reason that very few
published cases award punitive damages, the fact that there are so
few reported decisions in and of itself serves to defeat the deterrent
effect of exemplary relief. Thus, while there may be some merit to
the argument that the current model is having an increased
deterrent effect through settlements, such an argument is difficult
to quantify and does not completely address the concerns raised in
this Article. Additionally, it is likely that the model proposed here-
which results in double damages absent an employer's showing of
good faith-would similarly deter discriminatory employer conduct
and encourage defendants to settle meritorious claims. 3
There may also be some concern regarding the inclusion of the
good faith defense in the liquidated damages proposal. This defense
will permit an employer to escape any liability for exemplary relief
or liquidated damages--even in those cases in which a jury has
found the employer liable for intentional discrimination.334 While
this possible criticism of the good faith defense rings true, the
potential benefits of this defense simply outweigh any possible
332. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the results of the JVR database search).
333. Indeed, as addressed earlier, the use of liquidated damages would provide greater
predictability for these claims and likely result in more settlements. See supra notes 312-15
and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of my proposal).
334. See supra Part V.A.4 (discussing the role of the good faith defense in my liquidated
damages proposal); cf. Johnson, supra note 249, at 105 (arguing that "[i]n order to avoid an
award of punitive damages, there must be some evidence that the defendant believed that he
was acting in good faith based on reasonable grounds that he was not discriminating").
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negatives. Indeed, this approach strongly encourages employers
to avoid liability by adopting and enforcing antidiscrimination pol-
icies in the workplace.335 If properly integrated into the liquidated
damages proposal, the good faith defense "has the potential to
make anti-discrimination programs the norm" thereby "result[ing]
in complete fulfillment of the deterrent purpose underlying Title
VII.,,336
The study presented in this Article and the proposed approach
for liquidated damages outlined above is consistent with recent
scholarship on employment discrimination litigation. Professor
Charles Sullivan recently noted the "[s]urprising unanimity" among
commentators who share the view that "the law is far behind the
times with respect to workplace discrimination. 33 v Professor
Sullivan has advised that the existing analytical frameworks "result
in relatively few verdicts for plaintiffs, despite strong reason to
believe that discrimination is pervasive."33 8 The results of the study
set forth in this Article similarly demonstrate that there are
"relatively few" published punitive damage awards for plaintiffs,
even in the face of this same pervasive discrimination found in
Professor Sullivan's analysis. 339 Though the call for liquidated
damages in Title VII may "depart[] radically from many prior
perspectives, 34 ° the addition of this form of relief would help serve
to effectuate Congress's goal of deterring unlawful conduct.341
Similarly, Professor Michael Zimmer recently highlighted the
"dismal success rate for plaintiffs in discrimination cases. 3 42
Professor Zimmer noted that any argument that these cases are
being rightly decided as a general matter is "undercut" by the
existing "evidence that discrimination continues to plague the
American workplace. 343 If discrimination can still correctly be
characterized as a plague in this country, the imposition of
335. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 544-45 (1999).
336. Schiffner, supra note 14, at 210.
337. Sullivan, supra note 208, at 1000.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1002.
341. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt.2, at 1 (1991).
342. Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither
McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1944 (2004).
343. Id.
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liquidated damages on those employers who intentionally discrimi-
nate in bad faith would go a long way toward curing the illness. At
a minimum, the liquidated damages proposal set forth above would
provide a system of relief where awards would be more consistently
and fairly applied.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Kolstad, Professor Judith
Johnson noted that "[t]he standards for exemplary damages in
employment discrimination cases [were] in disarray. 344 Professor
Johnson recommended adopting a standard for determining
whether punitive damages were appropriate in a Title VII case that
would "be the same as that approved by the Supreme Court for
liquidated damages."4 Professor Johnson's assessment of the law's
confusion over punitive damages is even more valid almost a decade
after the Kolstad decision, and this Article-bolstered by the results
of the study set forth above-proposes going even further by
replacing the current structure of punitive relief in Title VII with a
liquidated damages framework.
CONCLUSION
Punitive damages have long been a basic foundation of the
American legal system. 46 This form of exemplary relief did not play
an important role in employment discrimination cases until 1991,
when Congress added punitive damages to Title VII.347 In Kolstad,
the Supreme Court generated significant confusion in the lower
courts and in academic scholarship when the Court attempted to
formulate the proper standard to apply in Title VII punitive
damages cases. 34' The results of the study set forth in this Article
call into question the effectiveness of exemplary relief in the
344. Johnson, supra note 249, at 41.
345. Id. at 42; see also Johnson, supra note 269, at 561 ("A court which determines that the
defendant intentionally discriminated is simply wrong to find that the facts are insufficient
to support an award of punitive damages. The award of punitive damages should be
presumptively appropriate in all cases in which the defendant intentionally discriminated.").
346. See supra Part IA (discussing the history of punitive damages in the American legal
system).
347. See supra Part II (discussing the history of punitive damages in employment
discrimination cases).
348. See supra Part III (discussing the Kolstad decision).
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employment discrimination context.349 At a minimum, there is
significant room for debate as to whether punitive damages are
achieving the deterrent purpose that Congress intended they
achieve when it amended Title VII to include this form of relief.35 °
It is time that we take another look at the remedial provisions of
the statute and consider making significant revisions. The congres-
sional goal of deterring unlawful conduct would be achieved under
the proposed framework set forth in this Article-substituting
liquidated damages for punitive damages in Title VII cases.35' By
directly correlating liquidated damages with the actual harm
suffered by the victim-and by providing a good faith exception for
employers to avoid the imposition of any additional damages-this
proposal would result in a damages structure far more equitable
than the system currently in place under Title VII.352 Additionally,
the proposed liquidated damages framework would bring Title VII
more in line with the damages provisions found in other areas of
employment law.353
Decisive action revising the Title VII remedial framework is thus
necessary to secure the basic protections of the statute which affords
equality in employment. Indeed, "[the] best principles" of our
country "secure to all citizens a perfect equality of rights."354 That
"perfect equality" should extend to employment as well.
349. See supra Part IV (discussing the results of my study of Title VII punitive damages
cases).
350. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.2, at 1 (1991).
351. See id.; supra Part VI (discussing the implications of my liquidated damages proposal).
352. See supra Part V.A (discussing the equitable nature of my liquidated damages
proposal and the good faith exception).
353. See Part V.A (discussing the damages provisions of the ADEA and FLSA).
354. Michael John DeBoer, Equality as a Fundamental Value in the Indiana Constitution,
38 VAL. U. L. REV. 489, 503 & n.46 (2004) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Reply to the Citizens of
Wilmington, 1809, in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THoMAs JEFFERSON 336 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds.,
Memorial ed. 1903-04)).
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